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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Problem 
The subject o£ unionization among American en-
gineers is importantly related to the present shortage o£ 
trained engineers in industry. The Ucold wartt headlines in 
today's newspapers point to the fact that the supply of 
trained engineers has an important bearing on the nation's 
defense effort. Evidence of this critical shortage can be 
found in the Help Wanted columns of the same newspapers. 
High-pressure advertisements, which look more like product 
sales messages than offers of employment, prove the exis-
tence of intense competition among companies. 
The present shortage of engineering personnel re-
sults from the sudden growth of uscientificn industry, par-
ticularly since the end of World War II. Advances in such 
fields as automation, electronics and atomic energy have 
ushered in an era of progress that is unparalleled in the 
history of the world. However, because of the threat of 
Soviet aggression, most of the increased demand for engineers 
stems from military requirements. For example, the guided 
missile and atomic programs of the United States Government 
call for the expenditure of many thousands of engineering 
manhours. The aircraft and electronics industries, which are 
primarily engaged in defense work, demand a large number of 
professional engineers. And though military requirements 
have created a substantial part of the increased demand, the 
civilian needs are also enormous. 
In the face of this great demand, there are not 
nearly enough qualified engineers to go around. According 
to a recent survey conducted by Deutsch & Shea, Inc., tech-
nical manpower consultants, the annual demand for engineers 
exceeds the supply by some 6,500*. This figure represents 
approximately one third of industry's requirements. In part, 
this shortage can be attributed to the failure of the coun-
try's educational system to produce engineers in sufficient 
quantity. The situation becomes even more alarming when 
Russia's output of engineers is considered. Not only is the 
Soviet Union graduating a greater number of engineers yearly, 
but it also reported that they are better qualified than 
American graduate engineers**· 
The extraordinary expansion of the engineering 
profession in recent years has brought with it many signifi-
cant problems. At the core of these problems is the concern 
of the engineer in such areas as financial position, pro-
fessional status and treatment as an individual. Seeking to 
remedy their dissatisfactions, an increasing number of en-
gineers have turned to unionism. Some highly-paid engineers 
with seemingly excellent positions have joined such unions 
* 14, P• 94 
**44, pp. 166-168 
5 
as the Engineers and Scientists of America, the American 
Federation of Technical Engineers, AFL-CIO and even produc-
tion workers' unions such as the United Auto Workers, AFL-
CIO. The majority of the profession, somewhat uncertain as 
to a course of action, look hopefully to management and the 
engineering societies for an equitable solution. 
The engineer oacupies a ·unique place in today•s 
industry. Unlike their professional ancestors, they most of-
ten work in large groups. This situation has created a new 
class of employee -- the practitioner of a profession who is 
also a salaried worker. This type of employee has an entire-
ly different relationship with his employer than the staff 
specialist or the professional who is called in on a con-
sulting basis. The group work of engineers has created one 
of the conditions which make unionization of engineers 
possible. 
Management, for the most part, has been slow to 
recognize the causes and implications of engineering union-
ism. The engineer has traditionally been considered to be a 
loyal employee whose professional standing raises him above 
the rank and file of labor, and insures a close association 
with management. However, recent disclosures of engineering 
dissatisfaction plus the increased activity of organized 
labor are beginning to alter management's view. 
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Though the number of unionized engineers is, at 
present, relatively small (the highest figure reported being 
12.per cent of the entire profession*), the fact that some 
members of the profession are active unionists indicates that 
there are areas of discontent. Should this discontentment be-
come widespread, the country 1 s military and economic progress 
may be seriously affected. Therefore, it is of prime impor.:,;. 
tance to eliminate these causes of friction. 
B. Method of Approach 
The majority of references applicable to this study 
were obtained from official publications of engineering soci-
eties and technical trade associations. Written primarily by 
practicing engineers, they generally convey the attitude of 
the engineer_towards unionism. However, it should be remem-
bered that many of the officials and spokesmen of these or-
ganizations are industrial executives. Therefore, the views 
of management concerning unionism are intermingled with those 
·of the engineer on the.working level. 
Included in the references used in this report are 
many surveys conducted·among engineers on the subject of union-
ism. Sponsored primarily by the engineering societies, they 
are valuable in determining· the areas of engineering discontent 
plus the extent and possible growth of unionism in the profes-
sion. 
*17' p. 22 
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It is not the intent of this study to weigh the 
relative merits of engineering unionism per se, but rather 
to investigate the causes and effects of this movement as 
applied to the various factions involved. In this light, 
engineers, engineering societies, management and unions 
will be considered from an unbiased viewpoint in order to 
insure a complete and impartial coverage of the subject. 
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II. THE PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER 
A. De:fini tion 
The dictionary defines engineering as the act and 
science by which the properties of matter and energy are 
made useful to man in structures, machines, and products. 
Accomplishment of these goals requires not only scientific 
training but also creative ability, judgment, and an appre-
ciation of the economics involved. The work of the engineer 
is predominantly intellectual in nature, requiring mental 
activity rather than manual skill. 
The engineer is a professional. He has the res-
ponsibility of protecting the health and safety of the pub-
lic. As in all professions, the engineer works in a relation 
of confidence. While this relationship is not on the per-
sonal basis peculiar to the tllearned professionstt (i.e. the-
ology, law and medicine), it nevertheless involves obliga-
tion to the general public as well as to the employer or 
client. 
Unlike most professions, the :field of engineering 
today is both broad and varied in scope. Many people at all 
levels of training and competence are required in engineer-
ing operations. This condition has contributed to the wide-
spread misuse of the word ttengineer''. Frequently, this 
title has been conferred·on such sub-professionals as 
9 
dra~tsmen and technicians without regard for its professional 
implications. Although these skills are indispensable to 
industry, they do not require the imagination, the educa-
tional background or the judgment o~ the engineer. By con-
trast there are other pro~essionals engaged in engineering 
operations who, erroneously, are referred to as engineers. 
The scientist is a prime example o~ this ~action. Here the 
line o~ demarcation is not too clear. The knowledge and 
skills required of the scientist are often similar to those 
required of the engineer. It is not unusual to ~ind these 
two classes of professionals working side-by-side on a 
common problem. However, the type and sequence of work 
generally separates these groups. The seientist is primar-
ily concerned with theoretical problems that lead to the 
establishment of verifiable general laws. Then the engineer, 
with a speci~ic product in mind, uses these laws as a basis 
for practical application. 
Our complex industrial economy sometimes makes it 
difficult to recognize even the qualified members of the en-
gineering profession. This large group ranges from the re-
cent college graduate undertaking his first professional 
chores to the experienced company president directing the 
e~forts of a large engineering sta~f in addition to produc-
tion and distribution operations. Between these extremes 
lies a vast number o~ heterogeneous assignments ranging from 
10 
''development engineertt to ttsales engineerlt; from tasks re-
quiring extensive technical knowledge to work demanding only 
an understanding of' the fundamentals. 
There has also been some confusion in establishing 
the number of' industrial-employed engineers. The figure 
cited in most references is 5oo,ooo, based on the 1950 Census 
of' the Federal Government~. The validity of' this statistic 
is questionable because of' the census technique of' counting 
engineers (and other occupational groups) without an official 
definition. Furthermore, the absence of' scientists in the 
occupational listing suggests that this group bad been in-
corporated into the engineering category. According to a 
more recent survey, 408,800 engineers were employed by in-
dustry**'• The accuracy of this figure is improved by the 
fact that industry rather than the general population was 
surveyed, and a clear distinction was made between scientists 
and engineers. A detailed breakdown of' this survey appears 
in the Appendix. 
In understanding the problem of unionism in the 
engineering profession, it must be recognized that engineers 
are predominantly ttemployees u. Therefore, self-employed 
supervisors and members of the profession are svecif'ically 
*lt5 p .. 261 
**46, p. 495 
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excluded from this study. A complete discussion of the en-
gineer's legal position is contained in the next chapter. 
B. The Layman's View 
The engineering profession has always been some-
what of a mystery to the layman. A major contributing fac-
tor has been the lack of direct contact between the engineer 
and the public. As a result, the engineer is not always 
looked upon as a professional, nor are his accomplishments 
always recognized. 
Engineers and scientists don't work with human 
ailments and problems, as do the ''learned professionsu, but 
more with the laws of nature and matter which are not well 
comprehended by the public. The average individual is 
naturally more interested in the services of a physician or 
a lawyer since they directly affect his well-being. Although 
essential to our civilization, the work of the engineer is 
remote - a means to an end. As one author commented, "You 
can't expect a housewife to admire the man that produced a 
more efficient engine half as much as she admires the surgeon 
that sewed up her six year old son's head after he fell out 
of the tree, or the lawyer that got her husband cleared of 
a murder chargeu*. 
*18, p. 3 
12 
In genera~, the engineer works for someone e~se, 
who is more likely than not to get credit and publicity for 
achievements of note; but this is not the main reason. 
Being conservative, the engineer seems to have an innate ob-
jection to self advertising. He doesn't shout from the roof 
tops about his accomplishments. The desire for recognition 
is restricted to associates within his own specialized field. 
Thus it is difficult for the public to associate the engin-
eer with technical advances that are so vital to our every--
day existence. 
c. The Engineering Societies 
The history of the engineering societies dates 
back to the pre-Revolutionary War era when military and 
civil engineers formed the first professional organizations. 
As the profession grew in numbers, accelerated by such dy-
namic periods as the Industrial Revolution, it branched into 
the many fields of specialization which we find today. With 
this growth, individual societies were organized in these 
various technical specialties. 
At present there are some seventy or eighty engin-
eering societies*. Of these, the largest specialized or-
ganizations are the American Society of Civil Engineers, 
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the American 
*30, p. 1~4 
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Institute of Electrical Engineers, and the Institute of Radio 
Engineers. Al~hough the total membership of all the soci-
eties is unknown, it has been estimated at somewhere between 
350,000 and ~0,000*. 
Down through the years, the societies have assumed 
the responsibility for promoting the technical aspects of 
the profession and the development of standards and engineer-
ing practices. In this endeavor, they have achieved excel-
lent results. However, with few exceptions, responsibility 
has not been assumed f?r providing an active program to pro-
mote the professional and economic status of the membership. 
The unionization movement has demonstrated that these soci-
eties are essentially technical in nature and not, as many 
engineers believed, professional societies designed to meet 
the organizational needs of the engineering profession. 
A number of factors have contributed to this un-
desirable situation. One of these is concerned with the 
growth of the profession and the resulting changing role of 
the engineer in industry. In the past, the typical engineer 
was a highly regarded staff member ~hose proximity to manage-
ment virtually assured adequate economic and professional 
status. In this climate, the societies developed into pri-
marily technical organizations. In contrast, the engineer of 
today works within the confines of a large engineering group, 
far removed from direct contact with management. Thus, the 
individual engineer finds it difficult to obtain the status 
he desires. 
The organization of the societies is another con-
tributing factor. In addition to engineers on the working 
level, the membership includes former engineers who have 
graduated into the ranks of management. This latter group 
holds the offices, formulates the policies, and runs the or-
ganization. This is not to imply that the societies are not 
democratic. However, this condition has resulted in a basic 
conflict of interests, particularly with respect to promot-
ing the economic status of the engineer. The position of 
the societies on this question has naturally been strongly 
influenced by the interests of its officials. 
Perhaps the most often heard complaint is that 
there is a lack of professional unity. Each individual so-
ciety has gone its own route, independent of the others, 
without the necessary coordinated effort to enhance the sta-
tus of engineers. Many have concentrated so heavily on their 
technical specialty that they have failed to recognize the 
common problems. others are too small to be effective. 
Virtually all of the societies fear the loss of identity 
through collective action •. 
15 
Comparison with the legal and medical professions 
serves to emphasize this difficiency. During the growth of 
these professions, each was careful to retain a single over-
all organization to govern the behavior of its members, to 
act in their behalf when the entire group was affected, and 
to set standards of performance and admission. Each profes-
sion is permitted to establish secondary groups composed of 
members in particular fields of specialization for such pur-
poses as exchanging information and furthering research, but 
the principal society or association remains the supreme 
governing body to which all members are responsible.* 
A number of attempts have been made to unify the 
engineering profession in a manner similar to the pattern 
set by the medical and legal professions. The first of th~se 
occurred in 1915 when the .American Association of Engineers 
(AAE)\ was organized to stimulate public services of the pro-
fession and to promote its social and economic welfare. Its 
initial membership was limited to legally qualified profes-
sional engineers, but this standard was later relaxed. Never 
gaining more than token support from the profession, AAE mem-
bership numbered about 5,000 in 1952**· In 1932, a second 
attempt was made to unify the profession when the Engineers 1 
council for Professional Development (ECPD~ was formed by 
*20, p. 21 
**lr2, p. 12 
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several societies. Its effort has been directed primarily 
toward the promotion of the professional growth and status 
of engineers and potential candidates of engineering from 
the period of pre-college preparation thence through college 
and pre-registration to final recognition as a member of the 
profession. ECPD's most noteworthy achievement has been the 
accrediting of the majority of engineering schools*. Limited 
in scope to academic and ethical matters, it has fallen 
short of the desired professional organization. 
Another step in the quest for professional unity 
was taken in 193~ when the National Society of Professional 
Engineers (NSPE) was organized. Its membership is restricted 
to engineers registered under the laws of the various states. 
NSPE is dedicated to the advancement of the public welfare 
and the promotion of the professional, social and economic 
interests of the professional engineer. To attain these ob-
jectives, it works toward educating all pertinent groups 
(legislatures, educators, industry, etc.) at local, state 
and national levels**· 
The philosophy of NSPE is based on three elements 
believed to be essential to the future development of engin-
eering as a profession: 
*~3 p. 4o 
**37, p. 11 
17 
"1. The individual professional development by 
his attitudes, his activities and his participa-
tion in professional and civic affairs; 
2. The professional society must provide a vehicle 
through which he can effectively resolve his prob-
lems and provide an organization through which his 
activities will be effective; and 
3. The users of engineering services have the 
responsibility to provide an atmosphere for the 
maximum professional development of their engin-
eering personnel. ~1 * 
On the surface, NSPE appears to fulfill the ob-
jectives of a unified professional organization. Unfortu-
nately, a deeper investigation reveals some major defici-
encies. Like most state legislation, the laws that govern 
the licensing of professional engineers vary throughout the 
country, thereby setting different levels of requirements 
for membership. In addition, members are faced with the 
problem of reciprosity when relocating in another state. 
State licensing laws are enacted primarily to pro-
tect the public. In the case of the engineer engaged in the 
construction of buildings, bridges, highways, etc., these 
laws are necessary to ensure public safety, However, this 
*37, p. 11 
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type of engineer constitutes a small portion of the profes-
sion. The vast majority of engineers find little use for a 
license in general industry, other than its minor prestige 
value •. Many states required broad and extensive examina-
tions covering a period of years and therefore, make it dif-
ficult fo+ the specialized candidate to maintain proficiency 
in other areas of engineering. 
Up to the present time, NSPE has apparently not 
sold itself to the average engineer. The membership, which 
stood at 30,000 in 1954*, would seem to support this conten-
tion. Nevertheless, it is a dynamic society that recognizes 
the basic problems and could conceivably form the nucleus of 
a unified organization. 
The most recent attempt at unification occurred in 
1941 when four of the larger engineering societies formed 
the Engineers' Joint Council (EJC) to coordinate the activi-
ties of these constituent societies in matters of mutual in-
terest*t The objectives of EJC, which now is composed of 
representatives of all of the major engineering societies, 
are: 
a. Advance the general welfare of mankind through the 
available resources and creative ability of the engineering 
profession. 
*37, p. 11 
**42, p. 12 
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b. Promote cooperation among the various branches of the 
engineering profession. 
e. Advance the science and profession of engineering. 
d. Develop sound public policies respecting national and 
international affairs wherein the engineering profession can 
be helpful through the services of the members of the engin-
eering profession*. 
Since its existence, EJC has been charged with the 
planning of a unified organization. Among many plans con-
sidered were those involving a federation of engineering 
societies, merger of EJC with NSPE, and the adoption of NSPE 
as the unity society. To date, none of these proposed solu-
tions has received sufficient support from the membership of 
the individual societies. In part, this condition can be 
attributed to the fact that the memberships of the partici-
pating societies have had only a remote opportunity in the 
selection of their EJC representatives. other disputes 
center about such matters as financing, authority, membership 
requirements, etc. 
Although its progress has been slow, EJC is pres-
ently recognized as the dominant force in the struggle for 
unification. It is impossible to predict when EJC or some 
similar organization will achieve the objective. This will 
*32, p. 148 
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depend largely on the level of cooperation among the individ-
ual engineering societies. Perhaps engineers will one day 
achieve a status similar to that enjoyed by the members of 
the medical and legal professions. 
21 
III. ENGINEERING UNIONIZATION AND LABOR LEGISLATION 
A. The Wagner Act 
The first labor law to materially affect the 
unionization of engineers was the National Labor Relations 
Act, better known as the Wagner ~ct. When it was signed in-
to law on July 5, 1935, declaring a national policy t1to di-
minish the causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing 
interstate and foreign commerceu,* the advent was largely 
unnoticed by the engineering profession. Engineers, like 
many others, were more concerned with the affairs of every-
day life, such as finding employment and improving their 
economic standards in the face of the world wide depression 
of only a few years previous.** 
The primary objective of the Wagner Act was to 
guarantee to employees ttthe right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing, and 
to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protectionu.*** 
Interpretation and administration of these "rights 11 was the 
responsibility of the National Labor Relations Board, a gov-
erning body organized under this law. This Board had the 
*l, p. 7005 
**2, p. l 
***1' p. 7012' 
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power to u ••• _decide in each ease whether, in order to insure 
to employees the full benefit of their right to self organi-
zation and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effec-
tuate the policies of this Act, the unit appropriate for the 
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employee unit, 
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof''·* 
Basically, the Wagner Act was enacted to foster 
labor's interests by providing the means to combat individu-
al managements and industrial associations. The law was main-
ly intended to protect the unskilled and unorganized workers 
in mass production types of industries. As a result, only 
two factions were recognized as existing in the industrial 
world -- employers and employees. It was hoped that the in-
evitable conflicts between these two sides would be equitably 
resolved through the process of collective bargaining as 
prescribed in the Act. 
Unfortunately for engineers, the Act had no provi-
sion for the separate treatment or recognition of profes-
sional employees as a distinct class. Legally, they were 
considered to be the same kind of labor commodity as any 
other trade or type of employment. The trade unions were 
quick to recognize this fact and exploit the situation. 
*l, p. 7017 
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Professional engineers were "babes in the woods 11 
at the game of organizing for labor advantage. Their num-
bers among the labor masses were so insignificant as to make 
it practically impossible for them to express their wishes, 
let alone hope that their desires might be given considera-
tion.* 
It was not impossible :for a group of professional 
employees to :form their own bargaining organizations under 
the Wagner Act, but such action was complicated and diffi-
cult. As a result of the Act and interpretations and deci-
sions of the National Labor Relations Board, professional 
engineers were required, in many instances, to join unions 
composed almost wholly of nonprofessional employees in the 
manual trades in order to hold their jobs. Other situations 
developed in which engineers found their collective bargain-
ing right being claimed by unions with which they did not 
wish to be affiliated. Once members, it was almost impos-
sible :for the professional employees to withdraw from these 
heterogeneous:unions. They had to retain membership to hold 
their jobs, and being in the minority, were unable to choose 
their own representatives or to gain adequate opportunity to 
express their views. As a result, they became increasingly 
bewildered and discouraged.** 
*33, :p. 3lt7 
**35, p. 827 
For example, in an early case involving the Willys 
Overland Motor Company, the company contended that engin-
eers, designers, and artists in its research department and 
certain draftsmen and tool designers in its tool-design de-
partment should be excluded from the bargaining unit because 
their work was confidential and they were professional work-
ers. The Board ruled, however, that these employees should 
be included in the unit because "the work done in the ex-
perimental and research building is absolutely essential to 
the continued operation of the main production departmentstt.* 
There was one Board decision which helped engineers 
in their fight against trade union domination. In 1937, the 
NLRB enunciated the so-called Globe doctrine, which amounted 
to a declaration that in weighing all the factors which are 
involved in the determination of an appropriate bargaining 
unit, the desires of a distinguishable group of employees 
will be considered where there is a conflict between repre-
sentation groups. Although applied primarily to represen-
tation conflicts between craft and industrial wide units, 
this doctrine authorized the setting up of a separate bar-
gaining unit for professional employees when such a unit was 
desired.** 
*7, p. 1.0 
**2, p. 5 
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The Globe doctrine was reiterated in several cases 
involving professional employees. One of the earliest of 
these was a case involving the Shell Development Company 
which was decided in 1942. In this case the American Chemi-
cal Society fought to prevent the inclusion of certain pro-
fessional employees in a bargaining unit which was to be 
represented by a CIO union. This unit was made up largely 
of nonprofessional employees. The NLRB ruled: 
"'· •• professional employees might properly be con--
sidered either as a separate unit or as part of a 
larger unit composed of professional and nonprofes-
sional employees. Under such circumstances, we 
apply the principle that the determining factor 
is the desire of the professional employees. We 
shall, therefore, direct separate elections in 
order that we may ascertain the wishes of the pro-
fessional employees. tt* 
In spite of these favorable decisions, large num-
bers of engineers were still being forced to join trade 
unions. Some professional engineers looked to their national 
engineering societies for guidance, and there developed ·a 
swell of demand that something be done to help them out of 
their plight. But, like the individual engineer, the field 
*7' p. 10 
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of labor relations was new to the professional societies. 
None knew what course to pursue, let alone bow to pursue it. 
A number of leaders in the profession advocated specific ex-
emption for all professional employees, but it became evident 
that a very large number of employees did not want exemp-
tion. One society went so far as to contemplate denying 
membership to any who took part in collective bargaining, 
but that program was abandoned when sober second thought in-
dicated the manifest injustice that would have been inflicted 
on those who, frequently against their desires, bad been in-
cluded in bargaining units.* 
The engineering societies did, however, take some 
significant steps to alleviate the situation. This was ac-
complished through various studies and policy statements 
which provided a guide for action. They generally concluded 
that the most desirable long-range objective would be a change 
in the Wagner Act which would prohibit the forced inclusion 
of professional men in labor-dominated bargaining units and 
which would permit them to refrain from collective bargaining 
if they chose to do so. For an immediate remedy, they advo-
cated the formation of professional unions similar to those 
authorized under the Globe doctrine.** 
*35, p. 827 
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The societies did not support professional union-
ism because they were in favor of it, in fact most of them 
were strongly opposed to such a course; rather it reflected 
a situation of legal frustration. In short, this course of 
action was the lesser of two evils. As a result, many of 
the engineering unions of today, or their predecessor or-
ganizations were sponsored in varying degrees by engineering 
societies.* 
B. The Taft-Hartley Act 
The engineering societies waited twelve long years 
for the correction of the abuses to professional employees 
under the Wagner Act. When the opportunity presented itself 
during the first session of the 80th Congress, the societies· 
collectively submitted several major goals they hoped to 
achieve under this new labor law. These goals were: 
l. A clear-cut definition of 1fprofessional employee 1'. 
2. Protection of the right of professional employees 
not to join a union if they so desired. 
3. Protection of the right of the same employees to 
f'orm unions representing their own interests as an alterna-
tive to being forced to join production workers' unions.** 
The pertinent sections of the Labor-Management 
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 19~7, reflected the success 
*2, p. 8 
**7, p. ll 
28 
of their efforts. The term professional employee as included 
in the Act reads: 
"(a) Any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly 
intellectual and varied in character as opposed to 
routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; 
(ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion 
and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a 
character that the output produced or the result ac-
complished cannot be standardized in relation to a 
given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an 
advanced type in a field of science or learning cus-
tomarily acquired by a prolonged course of special-
ized intellectual instruction and study in an institu-
tion of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished 
from a general academic education or from an appren-
ticeship or from training in the performance of 
routine mental, manual, or physical processes; 
or 
(b) Any employee who (i) has completed the course of 
specialized intellectual instruction and study des-
cribed in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is 
performing related work under the supervision of a 
professional person to qualify himself to become a 
professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).u* 
*1, p. 7008 
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Section 7 of the Act protects the right of profes-
sionals not to join any union. This section guarantees em-
ployees the right to organize and bargain collectively but 
also guarantees them ttthe right to refrain from any and all 
such activities ••• :t~* 
Another section of this law directs the NLRB to 
exclude professionals from sub-professional bargaining units 
unless a majority of the profession employees vote to be in-
cluded in such a unit. This section specifically provides: 
tl ••• (b) The Board shall decide in each case whether, 
in order to assure to employees the fullest free-
dom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this 
Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of 
collective bargaining shall be the employer 
unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision 
thereof: provided, that the Board shall not (1) 
decide that any unit is appropriate for such 
purposes if such unit includes both professional 
employees and employees who are not professional 
employees unless a ma·jori ty of such professional 
employees vote for inclusion in such a unit.u** 
Engineers, like most professional employees, were 
elated over these provisions which reflected their desires 
*l, p. 7012 
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and interests as a distinct group. At last they had statu--
tory protection against the wave of unionism, and it was 
hoped that the labor unions would respect these rights. 
However, soon after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, 
union officials strongly criticized the professional provi-
sions. 
In 1948, Joseph A. Beirne, President of the Com-
munications Workers of America, complained to a congressional 
committee that Uthe establishment of a special category or 
class for professional workers is creating a problem of con-
fusion and unrest in our industry.u* The basis of the com-
plaint was that the professional employees in telephone com-
panies had been using the professional provisions of the Act 
to escape from undesired representation. 
Opposition was also voiced during unsuccessful at-
tempts to repeal the Act in 1949 and amend it in 1953. At 
Congressional hearings, labor leaders fought against a con-
tinuation of the professional provisions as well as other 
features of the law. The President of the American Federa-
tion of Labor told a hearing body that: 
u ••• it has proved extremely difficult to draw 
the line between professional and nonprofes-
sional workers, particularly if the latter are 
*2, p. 23 
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technically qualified. One of the American Federa-
tion of Labor affiliates most directly concerned 
(American Federation of Technical Engineers) has 
found that its collective bargaining activities 
in behalf of both professional and nonprofessional 
workers have been hindered by this provision in the 
law. We ask that the requirement of separate units 
for professional workers be eliminated.u* 
~s in the past, the engineering societies defended 
the rights guaranteed by the professional sections of the 
Act. They pointed out that these provisions did not pre-
vent nonprofessional unions from attempting to organize en-
gineers. However, they did reaffirm the right of the en-
gineer to choose his bargaining unit or to refrain from any 
collective bargaining representation. 
Since the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, many 
cases involving the professional clauses have come before 
the National Labor Relations Board. A. study of these cases 
would indicate that the Board has done a creditable job in 
determining the professional status of employees. Evidence 
of this efficiency stems from the fact that whereas there 
have been court tests of almost every portion of the Act, 
*2, p. 2lt 
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there has not been a single legal attack on the pro~essional 
provisions by unions, employers or individuals.* 
The following cases illustrate the criteria on 
which the NLRB has based rulings regarding the professional 
nature of a group of engineers. In granting pro~essional 
status, the Board stated in a case involving the Southern 
Bell Telephone Company and the Communication Workers of 
America; CIO: 
"In the group of engineers, junior engineers, and 
fieldmen, approximately 69 per cent are either 
college graduates or have had some college educa-
tion. All of the student engineers are college 
graduates and hold engineering degrees •••• The 
work o~ the engineers, junior engineers, and 
student engineers is predominantly intellectual 
and varied, and their output cannot be standar-
dized in relation to a given period o~ time. The 
projects on which they are engaged require sub-
stantial portions o~ the type o~ knowledge usual-
ly acquired in scientific courses in institutions 
of higher education, principally in the field of 
electrical engineering. To a lesser extent, the 
work requires some knowledge o~ civil and mechani-
cal engineering, higher mathematics, and economics ••• 
*2, p. 22 
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Based on research, information supplied from 
other sources, and personal investigation of 
conditions at the site of the project, the en-
gineers must exercise independent judgment and 
discretion in working out their part of the 
project."* 
In another group of cases, the NLRB decided that 
the employees in question did not fall into the catagory of 
professionals. In one case involving Starrett Brothers & 
Eken, Inc. and the International Federation of Technical 
Engineers, AFL, the Board ruled: 
''None of the members of the surveying party is 
required to possess a professional degree. 
Authority to hire and discharge members of a 
surveying party rests with the chief engineer • 
••• Although members of a surveying party per-
form technical work, predominantly routine and 
nonprofessional in character, they have similar 
and closely related skills and collective bar-
gaining interests, and they may function to-
gether for collective bargaining purposes • 
••• In common with members of a surveying party, 
the computer, estimator, and draftsman are 
*7, p. 13 
compensated on a weekly basis, and receive the 
same sick leave and severance pay benefits. None 
of the employees is required to have an engineer-
ing degree or equivalent education; their work is 
essentially routine and nonprofessional in nature."* 
In addition to those cited in the above case, a 
number of other factors have been taken into account by the 
NLRB in determining what is a professional unit. The more 
important factors behind the Board's rulings have been sum-
marized as follows: 
"1. Title is the least important factor. 
2. Type of work performed by the individual or 
group; degree of independent judgment, discre-
tion, supervision, intellectual vs. standardized 
approach, etc. 
3. Registration by a state as a professional 
person, noted in case of engineers, nurses, 
doctors and lawyers. 
~. Standard requirements of the employer for 
the position. 
5. Requirements of the position; is it one 
which is usually filled by a professional 
person? 
*7, p. llt 
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6. Educational background. 
7. Distinction between technical and profession-
al employees."* 
Although the Taft Hartley Act now supports the 
right of the engineer to decide his own fate, it, like all 
laws, is subject to change. Past history has proven the 
controversial nature of the Act and organized labor's op-
position to it. The professional sections and associated 
NLRB rulings have restricted the large trade unions in their 
attempts to organize the key professionals in industry. To 
some extent, the important white-collar unionism movement 
has been affected. It is not unlikely, therefore, that at-
tempts will be made to repeal or modify the existing profes-
sional provisions at future Congressional sessions. The 
success or failure of these attempts will undoubtedly be 
subject to the ever-changing political climate. 
As in the past, the engineering profession, 
through the combined efforts of the societies, must be pre-
pared to defend its rights. Eternal vigilance is the price 
that engineers must pay if the gains achieved under the Taft 
Hartley Act are not to be lost. 
*2, p. 33 
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IV. THE ENGINEERING UNIONS 
A. Engineers and Scientists of America 
One of the several types of unions which engineers 
join is the professional, independent organization. A prime 
example of this type, and the largest engineering union, is 
the Engineers and Scientists of America (ESA). This union 
was activated in December, 1952, with the affiliation of sev-
eral independent collective bargaining groups of engineering 
employees.* 
Organization of ESA got under way in August, 1951, 
as a successor to the National Professional Association of 
Engineers, Architects and Scientists, which included four West 
Coast Groups. Recognizing the need for a stronger and broader 
coordinating organization, the leaders of this group sought 
the council of East Coast representatives. At conferences 
held in Chicago, delegates of 21 separate engineering unions, 
having a total ~embership of 15,000, met to develop a form of 
organization that would be acceptable to the largest possible 
number of employees. A proposed constitution and by-laws was 
drafted and the name Engineers and Scientists of America was 
chosen.** Names of the charter organizations and of the com-
panies employing their members are given in the Appendix of 
this report. 
*l2l- P• 161 
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The organiza~ion of ESA is similar to that of the 
trade federations. It does not have individual members. The 
affiliated unions, known as member units, handle their own 
affairs such as negotiating collective bargaining agree-
ments, electing union officers, setting of dues and adminis-
trating union policies. The constitution provides for "com-
plete autonomy in matters of local concern insofar as it is 
consistent with the constitution and by-laws of ESAu.* 
The purposes of this union, as stated in its con-
stitution, are: 
u ••• to promote the public welfare, the economic, 
professional and social welfare of engineering 
and scientific employees by: 
a. Gathering and disseminating to the member 
units, engineering students and other interested 
parties, information concerning salaries and 
working conditions, living costs, bargaining 
procedures, legislation, and other pertinent 
information; 
b. Assisting in the establishment of collective 
bargaining units of professional employees, and 
assisting such units, upon their request, in bar-
gaining negotiations with employees, and in proceed-
ings under the National Labor Relations laws; 
*4, p. l 
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c. Rendering assistance in the organization of 
other similar homogeneous groups of professional 
employees; 
d. Acting as spokesman for all engineering and 
scientific employees before government bodies; 
e. Seeking improvement in the quality of en-
gineering and scientific education and promot-
ing in educational institutions a better under-
standing of industrial employment.n* 
Membership in ESA is restricted to member units 
representing nonsupervisory engineering and/or scientific 
employees. At the present time, the union claims a repre-
sentation of about 4o,ooo engineering and scientific employ-
ees in 25 local collective bargaining associations.** These 
locals cover many of the large aircraft corporations, es-
pecially those located on the West Coast. In addition, many 
members are employed by a number of large companies in the 
electronics field. 
The actual number of engineers in the ESA is sub-
ject to conjecture. The union claims 30,GOG engineers as 
nmembersn.*** It should be noted here that membership and 
representation are two entirely different matters. 
*4,_·pp. 1-2 
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former are the actual dues-paying individuals who belong to 
the member units, while the latter are employees who are 
represented by the union in collective bargaining negotiations. 
Furthermore, ESA has admitted units whose membership is com-
prised of some draftsmen, technicians, engineering aides and 
technical writers. For example, it has been estimated that 
of the 2,200 employees represented by the Engineers' Associ-
ation at Sperry Gyroscope Company, approximately 50 per cent 
are in nonprofessional classifications.* 
On the basis of a cursory study of the information 
obtained, it would appear that a substantial number of en-
gineers claimed by ESA are not professional employees as de-
fined under the Taft-Hartley Act. until more ESA units are 
subject to NLRB rulings, the extent of engineering member-
ship will remain in doubt. However, a realistic estimate 
would be somewhere in the neighborhood of 15,000 engineers. 
Notwithstanding the revised estimate of membership, 
ESA is still the largest ttengineering 11 union. As such, it 
is important to investigate some of its policies, accom-
plishments, and practices. 
A basic principle of ESA is that engineers require 
union representation. Like all unions, it believes that 
*2, p. 63 
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collective bargaining is the only effective tool for improv-
ing salaries and employment conditions. Joseph Amann, Presi-
dent of ESA, in a debate on the subject of engineering union-
ism, made the following statement regarding this question: 
"There is a real need for engineers• unions -
particularly in the aircraft industry, because 
it is highly organized at the management level 
(in the Aircraft Industries Association). Also, 
since engineers are employed in large numbers, 
they are often treated as a group, not as indi-
viduals. They cannot get to the guy who makes 
the decisions. The only way to get to him is 
through collective action.u* 
The union defends collective bargaining as a method accepted 
by society, and which has the full backing of Federal legis-
lation. 
Although they approve of the collective bargaining 
process, ESA leaders and members are not willing to abandon 
their claim to professional status individually or collec-
tively. Whether or not they have done so already is an open 
question depending on individual viewpoint. In articles, 
publications and speeches, ESA officials have insisted that 
collective bargaining for engineers and professional status 
*9, P• 22 
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are not compatible. Nor do they feel that unionism tends to 
lower an engineer• s pres.tige. on these questions, Mr. Ainann 
had this to say: 
11Belonging to a union has no effect on the en-
gineer's prestige in the community. As for his 
professional status, I think engineers tend to 
evaluate other engineers or scientists not by 
what they belong to but by their technical com-
petence. So far as I know, there have been 
practically no cases where management has taken 
a different attitude toward an individual because 
of his union activity. 11* 
ESA has backed up its stand on collective bargain-
ing by some apparently impressive achievements. While 
general in nature and somewhat prejudicial, they neverthe-
less reflect the strength of engineering unionism. An anal-
ysis of these benefits and their influence on the engineer-
ing profession will be deferred until a later chapter. 
ESA groups claim to have advanced the general level 
of salaries by: 
ttl. Negotiating percentage general salary in-
creases rather than levelling cents-per-hour 
increases; 
*9, p. 22 
2. Securing additional increases for the top 
classifications and more experienced employees; 
and 
3. Pressing for a guaranteed merit review funds, 
which the employer must disburse each year in 
individual merit increases.''* 
The~ union also claims certain indirect financial 
benefits. Although salaried professional employees are not 
entitled to overtime compensation under Federal law, ESA 
groups have negotiated premium overtime pay for their 
salaried members. To further professional competency and 
efficiency, the member units have negotiated tuition refunds 
and leaves of absence for advanced education and g~ined em-
ployer sponsorship of technical society participation.** 
In addition to salary increases, and overtime and 
educational benefits, the local associations have also nego-
tiated contract provisions covering layoff and termination 
policies, grievance procedures, group medical and insurance 
programs, vacation policies and patent bonuses. Further-
more, the union claims to have improved relations between 
top management and engineers by means of a direct channel of 
communication.** 
*8, pp.4-5 
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The techniques employed by ESA are not different 
from those of any other union. It seeks to negotiate with 
the employer for higher benefits, using all of the standard 
collective bargaining practices. Although there are compro-
mises and eventual settlement most of the time, occasionally 
the two sides do not come to an agreement. At this point 
the union must either capitulate or strike. No union can 
take the former action frequently without losing the support 
of its membership. Therefore, ESA has approved the use of 
strike to enforce its demands. When asked for his union's 
attitude on striking, Mr. Amann replied: 
tlAll ba~gaining rests on some type of ultimate 
weapon -- a strike on the part of the union, a 
lockout on the part of management. As a last 
resort my organization will use this device if 
necessary. Even professionals can be provoked 
into taking professional action. 11* 
The Minneapolis-Honeywell member unit of ESA was 
the first engineering union to have engaged in a strike, some 
years ago. In May, 1955, the same union authorized another 
strllike to bolster their wage demands, only to call it off when 
it was learned that trade unions representing other workers 
in the plant would not recognize the union's picket lines.** 
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The Engineers' Association of !rma, ESA, has had 
two strikes. The first, in 1951, was followed by one in 
1953 when the union called a strike of engineering employees 
after the company operations had been closed down by an elec-
trical workers' strike. Even though the electrical workers 
came to terms during the walkout, they respected the en-
gineers' picket lines. The strike lasted approximately nine 
weeks and was settled by acceptance of a minor gener_al in-
crease, a cost-of-living adjustment and other fringe benefits.* 
Perhaps the most publicized strike occurred in 
March, 195~, when the Engineers' Association at Sperry Gyro-
scope Company called a strike because the company refused to 
meet its economic demands. The dispute was a bitter one with 
ill feeling on both sides. In order to influence public 
opinion in favor of their position, the union placed an adver-
tisement in one of the largest New York newspapers. The 
Sperry engineers established a picket line which was respected 
by some 16,000 other workers, represented by trade union 
locals. Production was at a standstill for ten days when 
the union finally accepted the company's original offer.* 
These, and other incidents, proved that ESA and 
other engineering unions have had only mild success in en-
forcing their demands. This failure is due to a number of 
facto~s. First, ESA lacks the strength, experience and 
uknow-howtt that has made the strike a potent weapon of the 
larger trade unions. Economically, the membership cannot 
withstand the pressure of a long strike, even though their 
average wage is well above that of the production workers. 
In addition, production can usually continue for long periods 
of time without engineering assistance. 
It is interesting to note the union solidarity 
that had existed during these strikes. Except for the walk~ 
out at Minneapolis-Honeywell, the trade unions have continu-
ally supported ESA demands. This support, in many cases, 
has ttwon the dayt1 for the engineering unions. As Fortune 
magazine observed, tiThe engineers have learned, particularly 
in the Arma and Sperry strikes, where the CIO electrical 
union respected their picket lines, that they can be effective 
only when they have full cooperation of the blue-collar em-
ployeestt.* 
Recognizing the need for trade union assistance, 
the question of affiliation with the AFL-CTO has been raised 
at several ESA conventions. Although a significant minority 
is in favor of such an alliance, ESA leaders are definitely 
opposed to it. President Amann claims, " ••• the engineer 
needs separate representation; he would be swallowed up in 
*29, p. 72 
any giant labor alliance and his professional status watered 
down by combining with production workers."* Furthermore, 
until recently, union officials have not shown much concern 
about the organizing attempts of AFL and CIO unions. They 
feel that organizing pressure by the AFL-CIO will boost ESA 
membership because of the engineer's reluctance to become 
part of the united labor movement. 
This philosphy was somewhat shattered in 1956 when 
the ESA member unit at Minneapolis Honeywell Re~Iator Com-
pany voted to affiliate with the United Auto Workers. In a 
representation election a year later#, the independent was 
soundly defeated. These decisions have split the ranks of 
the union with other member units seeking trade union affili-
ation. ESA leaders have countered this action by restricting 
membership to degree-holding, professional-level engineers 
and scientists. Still another faction of the union feels 
that the only practical way to form an engineering bargaining 
unit that is strong enough to get results is to enroll drafts-
men, technical assistants and all other members of the engin-
eering :family.**' 
In the light of these developments, the future of 
ESA is in doubt. While the pure professional approach o:f the 
*23, p. 104 
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union may attract more engineers, the greater probability is 
that the conflicting interests of these groups will tend to 
repel potential members. 
B. Independent Unions 
A second major group of unionized engineers are in 
the independent unions which have not affiliated with the 
Engineers and Scientists of America. These independent unions 
are estimated to cover as many as 10,000 engineers and, like 
the ESA, have a predominantly professional membership. The 
following is a partial listing of these organizations:* 
Association of Engineers and Engineering Assistants 
General Electric Company 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
Southern California Professional Engineers Association 
Douglas Aircraft Corporation, Southern California Gas 
Co., Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
Association of Industrial Scientists, 
Shell Oil Company 
Emeryville, California 
Research & Engineering Professional Employees Association 
Standard Oil eompany 
Whiting, Indiana 
Association of Westinghouse Engineers 
Westinghouse Electric Elevator Division, 
Jersey City, New Jersey 
Republic Engineers Association 
Republic Aviation Corporation 
Farmingdale, New York 
Association of Professional Engineers, Chemists and 
Scientists, The Texas Company, 
Port Arthur, Texas 
*2, p. 64 
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c. American Federation of' Technical Engineers (AFL-CIO). 
The oldest af'f'iliated engineering organization is 
the International Federation of' Technical Engineers, Archi-
tects and Draftsmen, presently known as the American Federa-
tion of' Technical Engineers. Organized in 1918, it never en-
joyed a large following until recent years. However, inten-
sive campaigning over the past f'ew years has nearly doubled 
its membership, which is claimed to be 15,000.* 
Membership in the AFTE is not limited solely to 
engineers. It also includes draftsmen, architects, techni-
cians and others in allied fields. As set f'orth in its con-
sti tution, this union, ''· •• embraces within its jurisdiction 
all individuals who work in the general technical and scien-
tific f'ield of' engineering, architecture and allied occupa-
tions.tt** Among the classifications of' employees listed in 
collective bargaining contracts are: trainees, rodmen, chain-
men, draftsmen, instrumentmen, commercial consultants, public 
relations supervisors, assistant photographers, chief' milk 
sanitarians, apprentices, senior draftsmen, estimators.*** 
In view of' the heterogeneous nature of' the membership, the 
AFTE has not been a major factor in the unionization of' 
engineers. 
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D. United Automobile Workers (AFL-CIO) 
The a~~iliated union most active in o~ganizing the 
country's engineers is presently the United Automobile 
. . 
Workers. The UAW, representing production workers, has ~or 
• 
some time organized engineers and technicians in automotive 
companies. However, up until the merger o~ the AFL and cro, 
their engineering membership .was not signi~icant. 
When the AFL and CIO merged in 1955, the engineer 
- became a number one target o~ organized labor. The initial 
drive was directed at the large numbers o~ engineers in the 
aircra~t and electronics industries. Since UAW had substan-
tial representation·in these,industries, the prime responsi-
' bility ~or organi~ing was delegated to this a~~iliate. 
A~ter about a year o~ ~ormal planning and campaign-
ing, the UAW scored its ~irst victory when the Federation o~ 
Honeywell Engineers voted to a~~iliate with the auto union. 
This success~ul e~~ort led to the ~ormation o~ the Aircra~t 
and Avionics Engineering Council as part o:f the UAW National 
Aircra~t Department. In a press release, dated February 5, 
1957, Leonard Woodcock, vice president and director o~ this 
department said: 
UThe establishment o~ the Aircraft and AVionics 
Engineering Council o~ the UAW National Aircra~t 
Department will enable members o~ the engineering 
pro~essions in the aviation industry to a~:filiate 
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with a council that will preserve their identifi-
cation. At the same time, Council membership will 
enable them to join with the production and office 
workers in the same corporation and industry to 
gain recognition and to effectively present and 
achieve their demands from the tightly knit em-
ployees in this industry. 
''Existing technical and engineering groups of the 
UAW in the aviation industry will be integrated 
into the new Council if it appears desirable along 
with new engineering units.tt* 
The main purpose in setting up this Council as a 
separate entity was to make trade unionism more palatable to 
the engineer. Thus, the auto union has recognized the pri-
mary need for maintaining the professional status of the en-
gineer. As AFL President George Meany put it: ''Far from 
being Undignified or degrading, trade union membership has 
directly enhanced the standing of engineers in our society ••• tt** 
Competition from the independent professional unions 
is not considered to be a major obstacle. The UAW is con-
vinced that this independent membership will be won over by 
the advantages of a large powerful union. This reasoning has 
*52 
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been substantiated by its initial victory over the Engineers 
and Scientists of America at the Minneapolis-Honeywell Regu-
lator Company. In time, the auto union hopes to absorb ESA 
and the smaller independents. As one union official com-
mented: tiWhen they see what the merged federation can do, 
they'll come over. If not, they'll be disregarded.u* 
This wave of optimism continued until May, 1957,. 
when a representation election was held at the Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Company. In this crucial election, UAW 
was rejected by company engineers. An account of this elec-
tion, including interpretations and implications, is de-
tiled in a later chapter of this report. It suffices to say 
that the defeat has dealt a severe blow to UAW's plans for or-
ganizing the nation 1 s engineers. 
*23, p. 104 
52 
V. WHY ENGINEERS UNIONIZE:· .AREAS OF DISSATISFACTION 
A. General Comment 
No one remark has caused greater concern among en-
I 
gineers than that attributed to Matthew Woll, Vice President 
of the American Federation of Labor. Some twenty years ago, 
he told a group of engineers: 
HThe trouble with you engineers is that you fancy 
yourselves as professional men. Actually, you 
are just hired help. u* 
Down through the years, this statement has been 
the subject of many a trheated'' discussion within the ranks 
of the engineering profession. Some engineers have vehe-
mently denied it while others (particularly in recent years) 
have taken a more realistic view. Although they rebel at 
the implications of this comment, the latter group feel that 
there is an unfortunate germ of truth in it. The fact that 
the remark came from a union official has led some to be-
lieve that it is a prejudiced overstatement of the problem. 
Whatever its merit, events of the past years have indicated 
a definite strain in engineer-employer relations. 
The range of dissatisfaction with respect to the 
place of engineer-employees in industry goes from complaints 
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such as, ttthe company unreasonably restricts attendance at 
conventions 11 to charges such as, ''an increasing number of 
engineers are asking themselves why they became engineers 
and not steel workers, truck drivers, brick layers, etc., 
since at least in these positions they would fare better 
financiallytt.* Between these examples lies an almost un-
limited number of complaints. The bulk of the more impor-
tant criticisms is contained in the following sections on 
financial, professional and personal treatment. 
In analyzing these areas of dissatisfaction, a 
number of considerations must be borne in mind. Notwith-
standing the many surveys and comments of engineers cited, 
conditions vary greatly from company to company. Nor can it 
be concluded that any one or a number of adverse conditions 
will force the engineer to seek redress through collective 
bargaining. While the engineering societies and unions gen-
erally agree that these grievances do exist, they obviously 
do not concur with respect to a solution. Finally, the ex-
istence of discontent should not be overshadowed by the need 
for justification. Right or wrong, the engineer will be 
motivated by his feelings and attitude$. 
*2, p. 35 
B. Financial Treatment 
Perhaps the most widely heard complaint among pro-
f'essional engineers is that they are underpaid. O:f c-ourse, 
tbis discontent has been continually voiced by the majority 
of' all labor groups, both pro:fessional and non-pro:fessional. 
However, when talking about his pay, the typical engineer 
does not use the vocabulary o:f the :financially oppressed 
(t1I 1 m not making a living wageu, ttean•t make ends meettt, 
etc.). Ins.tead, he concentrates on salary injustices in 
relation to. his experience and compared with what other 
groups on the company payroll are earning. He is not so in-
tent on making a higher salary per se as he is on gaining 
the kind of' recognition his background, quali:fications and 
prof'essional contribution deserve. To the engineer, pay 
seems to be almost as important a status symbol as it is a 
means o:f acquiring the material goods o:f life.* 
Engineers are greatly concerned with the shrink-
ing earnings di:fferential between salaried engineers and 
wage earners. In terms of fringe benef'its, they :feel that 
their :former advantage over the production worker has been 
lost. 
Following are some speci:fic comments about the en-
gineer's pay when he thinks o:f himself' in relation to the 
*22, p. 33 
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labor trades: 
ttThe charwoman in our section is paid $80 a week; 
a starting engineer is paid $100-$120, depending 
on degree, etc.u 
'''My main gripe is pay scales -- a truckdriver, 
••• milkman makes approximately equal money 
with no requirements o:f a :formal education.tt 
11In this area, a carpenter, one o:f the lowest 
paid o:f the building trades, receives $5~, per 
month :for a 4o-hour week. Compare this with 
the starting salary o:f a B.S. or M.S. en-
gineer.u* 
These views are not con:fined to a hand:ful o:f en-
gineers, but are voiced by a large majority. In a survey o:f 
Boo engineers employed in the major industries, 76 per cent 
reported that their pay was not high enough in comparison 
with other positions requiring the same or less ability.* 
A study of engineers' salaries in relation to 
those of skilled labor bas also strengthened the engineer's 
ease. The new engineer, in 194o, received a salary that was 
65 per cent of the pay o:f the skilled workers. The engineer 
*22, p. 33 
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with 15 years• experience in 1940 was receiving a salary 1.95 
times the pay of skilled workers. In 1951 the 15-year man 
was getting only 1.2~ times the pay of skilled workers while 
the one-year man was getting 0.70 times the pay of skilled 
workers. The one-year man had actually improved his rela-
tionship ?.6 per cent.* 
The engineer with 5 years' experience took the 
worst beating. In 1940 his relationship was 1.20 and by 1951 
it had dropped to 0.94 or a loss of 21.6 per cent. The same 
engineer with 5.'.yea;rs .1 ·,:·experience in 1940 is the man with 16 
years 1 experience in 1951. If the increase in skilled 
workers 1 wages is about the same as the increase in cost of 
living, then this engineer has not increased his purchasing 
in 11 years of labor.* More recent data indicate that these 
ratio trends have continued. 
Another cause of eaonomic discontent lies within 
the engineering profession itself, and is commonly referred 
to as the t1Ieveling off11 problem. By this is meant that the 
salaries paid the older and more experienced engineers are 
not substantially higher than those paid the younger or less 
experienced engineers. This condition, in recent years, has 
stemmed from the competition for more graduates than were 
*34, p. 16? 
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available. Because o£ this shortage, industry is forced to 
pay higher starting salaries, but often no adjustment is 
made for older engineers to keep the spread between the ex-
perienced and inexperienced equal. 
The following complaint by a 1951 graduate of Case 
Institute of Technology is typical: 
. tiWhen I graduated four years ago, T got $298 a 
month. Today, I'm earning $463. Another Case 
man joined us this year from the class of 1955. 
He's getting $384. I 1 m not begrudging him his 
money, but I've had four years of experience here, 
and I 1 m getting only $79 a month more than he is.u* 
This wage differential has been substantiated by 
a recent survey conducted by the Engineers' Joint Council. 
From 1939 to 1956 engineers' median salaries increased 250 
per cent for beginners, but declined to 159 per cent for en-
gineers with 9 to 11 years' experience. For engineers with 
20 to 24 and 35 to 39 years' experience, the increase was 91 
and 65 per cent respectively.** Admittedly, a reduction in 
percentage increases with increasing experience (and salary) 
is fairly common. In the engineering profession, however, 
this situation is not prevalent among the less experienced 
*4o p. 30 
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groups. Therefore, the 91 per cent difference between begin-
ners and those with 9 to 11 years• experience is highly sig-
nificant. 
Another basis of complaint by engineers with res-
pect to their economic level is that the other major profes-
sions enjoy a higher economic standing. It is somewhat dif-
ficult to prove or disprove this thesis from the standpoint 
of engineering employees in industry because most of the 
other professions have a considerably higher percentage of 
members in the self-employed group.* This comparison is 
further complicated when such factors as education, training, 
and value of contribution are considered. 
Some engineers believe a more valid salary compari-
son can be made with fellow professional workers. On the 
average, the engineer's starting salary is slightly higher 
than that of a liberal arts or business administration gradu-
ate. At the end of five years this gap has disappeared. At 
the end of ten, the business ad or liberal arts man may hold 
an edge over the engineer, although this is bard to prove. 
They see John Smith from Turpentine Tech earning $7000 a 
year while Bill Jones from Business U is pulling down $12,000 
as a salesman.. And Smith has to tell Jones the difference 
between a rotor and a stator.** 
*2, p •. 45 
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A final area of financial dissatisfaction is con-
cerned with salary administration and hiring practices. A 
recently published report noted a strong feeling among en-
gineers that merit is sometimes subordinated to seniority in 
determining salary increases. In addition, glowing, high 
pressure advertisements by companies seeking engineers are 
cited as tending to make the engineer feel that his company 
does not pay as well as other companies.* 
C. Professional Treatment 
Like all highly educated men with a sense of dedi-
cation to important work, the engineer wants and expects pro-
fessional recognition. Threading ·through many of the en-
gineer's frustrations is the belief that management does not 
give enough recognition to his professional status. 
His attitude toward his job is inherently creative; 
the demands upon him for keeping abreast of the technologi-
cal revolution are growing. Furthermore, he has a profound 
consciousness that the future of industrial society may very 
well be squarely in his hands. And toward his profession, 
the engineer feels a very real sense of dedication. 
And apparently this kind of recognition is not de-
sired by the engineer solely for the personal gratification 
*17, p. 22 
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it may afford. An electrical equipment design engineer 
states: 
ttEngineers, as they say, are a strange breed of 
cats. Money is not their primary goal. What 
they want most of all is professional recognition. 
They are willing to devote their whole lives to 
study and work because they enjoy what they are 
doing.u* 
A great deal has been and can be said about the 
engineer's treatment as a professional. It is difficult to 
pin down just what is meant by ttprofessional statusu. Clear-
ly, the term may mean different things to different people. 
However, it is generally agreed that the aspects of profes-
sional treatment should differentiate the professional 
salaried employee from the nonprofessional worker.** Yet, 
it is in this area that management draws the most consistent 
criticism from the nation's engineers. This criticism has 
taken many forms; some very basic and important, while others 
are mere ngripes". 
To begin with, there is feeling among engineers 
that they are no longer identified with management. This 
condition has cQ@me about' in part' from the tremendous 
*22, p. 33 
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growth of the engineering labor force. In the past, indi-
Vidual companies employed relatively few engineers in high 
staff positions and considered them as part of the management 
team. Increased technological demands in recent years neces-
sitated the utilization of large engineering groups as line 
organizations. As a consequence, the engineer on the working 
level has lost his management identify. This demotion in 
status is particularly frustrating to the younger engineer 
who had been warmly prepared for a part in management in 
college and wooed with plenty of job offers upon graduation. 
Although most engineers accept employee status, 
they contend that their professional standing is not recog-
nized by employees. In a nonferrous metals company, a re-
search engineer expressed the majority opinion of an entire 
department on this point: 
liThe company regards engineers as a necessary 
evil in a friendly way, of course. Management 
thinks the point of view of engineers is typi-
cal of the species and must be tolerated. tt* 
Engineers in a metal parts fabricating company 
cite the engineer's low prestige compared with other groups, 
and on status symbols such as parking privileges. Some typi-
cal comments are: 
*22, p. 34 
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nrn this company the prestige of engineering 
is near the bottom compared to manufacturing 
and sales.u 
"We should have at least equal parking privileges 
with employees getting the same pay in purchas-
ing, sales, finance, and personnel departments."* 
There are other minor, but irritating, management 
practices which the engineer resents. Specifics of such 
nonprofessional status treatment may be found in such casu-
al per·sonnel practices as a rule requiring an engineer to 
Upunch a time clocku to account for time work where his phy-
sical movement on the job site may be limited as sharply as 
any hourly paid production worker' s.** 
A large segment of the engineering profession has 
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the attitude that management is not interested in their pro-
fessional development. Credit in reports and papers he helps 
develop is often denied the engineer blocking professional 
recognition. Engineers are often denied sufficient opportu-
nity to be active or hold office in their professional soci-
eties.*** To increase their professional standing, engineers 
also want such benefits as: (1) employer payment of professional 
*22, p •. 34 
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society dues; (2) paid time off to attend meetings of profes-
sional engineering societies; (3) tuition refunds on advanced 
c·ollege work while employed; and (4) educational and profes-
sional leaves of absence.,* 
Another general area of complaint is that the en-
gineer is improperly utilized below his level of professional 
talent, that his assignments are often in the subprofession-
al category and that he does not receive the type and amount 
of adequate supporting help a professional worker should 
have. 
A detailed survey on utilization techniques pools 
the experiences of almost 500 companies with 3,948 plants and 
more than 106,000 engineers in their employ. One of the ma-
jor findings was that despite the high demand for engineers, 
some companies were still using graduate engineers on rela-
tively unimportant jobs which a~uld be performed by non-
engineers.** 
In another survey of more than 1,300 engineers em-
ployed in all fields of engineering activity, 38 per cent 
felt that their company was not making effective use of their 
training and ab-ility.*** 
*39, p •. 37 
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one engineer complained bitterly: 
"I 1 m asked to do detail work that any good high 
school graduate with conventional courses in 
mechanical drawing could do. 11* 
An engineering union business agent, speaking be-
~ore a convention o~ engineers, expressed his ~eelings on 
the subject in this manner: 
uAn M.D. digging a ditch is a ditch-digger; an 
engineer making routine drawings is a dra~ts-
man. Ask yourself what proportion o~ your job 
actually requires a college degree for its satis-
~actory performance. The current hew and cry over 
the shortage of engineers sounds hollow to the 
employed engineer who is spending a large part 
of his time performing nonprofessional tasks. t1** 
The ever-present jungle of administrative red tape 
and onerous routine is also sharply criticized by the en-
gineer. As a professional he feels that his creative ener-
gies and producing drives are depleated in the struggle with 
clerical detail. In a survey, previously mentioned, 77 per 
cent of the engineers agreed that they had been given too 
much routine work.*** Asked what they least liked about 
*4o p. 30 
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their jobs, almost half of the engineers replied in words 
like these: 
tti like least the innumerable details involved in 
writing and editing departmental reports for sub-
mission to top management ••• much of this work 
could be performed by statistical clerks.u 
IIMuch of my work consists of detailed calcula-
tions and accounting details ••• There is simply 
nobody to delegate clerical chores to.u* 
Inadequate channels of communication between top 
management and non-supervisory engineers is also cited as a 
cause of discontent. Engineers want to be kept informed of 
~mpany policy; that is, they want to know what is happening 
outside their own work. In order to maintain initiative and 
a '''sense of belongingu, they feel that regular communications 
on company objectives are essential. And, as professionals, 
they want to be heard when decisions involving their work or 
status are made. 
D. Personal Treatment 
Contrary to popular opinion, the engineer in indus-
try is not unlike his fellow worker with respect to a desire 
for fair individual treatment. The people that tend to think 
*22, p. 32 
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of him as confined to an Hivory toweru, far above the condi-
tions of the everyday work situation, are forgetting that he 
is an employee. As part of the labor force, he is directly 
concerned with all company policies and practices that af-
fect his treatment as an individual. 
Specific criticism in this area requires no exten-
sive elaboration, being fairly common in today 1 s industrial 
complex. However, the engineer's dissatisfaction over per-
sonal treatment is strong and should not be arbitrarily 
placed behind his attitudes on financial and professional 
treatment. Among the many complaints, the following are 
consistently cited: 
(1} Inadequate recognition and treatment of the engineer 
as an individual. 
(2?) Lack of broad position classificationsand appropri-
ate titles by which. the engineer could measure his progress. 
(3) Inadequate or nonexistent plans for training and job 
rotation. 
(4) Inadequate understanding of promotional policies and 
belief that progress and promotions were not commensurate 
with ability and performance. 
(5) Feeling of insecurity of employment. 
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(6) Management's human relations knowledge and skills 
have not kept pace with the expanded utilization of engineers. 
(7) Lack of appropriate means for resolving individual 
problems.* 
*36, p. 537 
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VI. PROFESSIONALISM AND UNIONISM 
A. The Theory of' Unionism 
The unionism issue is not a new one to the engin-
eering profession. Engineers have been debating this ques-
tion f'or a long time. With the substantial growth of' the in-
dependents such as the Engineers and Scientists of' America 
over the past f'ew years plus the increased interest of the 
trade unions, the controversy has come into the open as never 
before. 
The battle lines in this struggle have been clearly 
drawn. On one side are most of the engineering societies, 
many of the leaders of the profession, and in some cases 
spokesmen for industries employing large numbers of engin-
eers. This faction regards the threat of unionization as 
the beginning of the end for the engineering profession and 
the start of a unionized trade. On the other side are the 
spokesmen for the independent and affiliated engineering 
unions who contend that unionism does not entail the loss of 
professionalism. This group claims that collective bargaining 
is the only device by which engineers can successfully deal 
with management. In the middle of this struggle are the 
thousands of' engineers employed in industry, many of whom are 
confused and uncertain. While they are often not satisfied 
with their financial, professional and individual treatment, 
they are doubtful that unionism can really help them in their 
primary goals of professional growth and economic advancement. 
Basic to this debate is the theory of professional 
unionism. ESA and other engineering unions have consistent-
ly taken the stand that unionism and professionalism are not 
incompatible. This view has had the support of some leading 
engineers. Somewhat typical of this group is the following 
comment by T. H. Evans, Dean of Engineering, Colorado A. & M. 
College: 
uunionism has a rather sinister connotation to many 
of us because of actions of the labor unions over 
the years. It can mean violence, lack of the pub-
lic interest at times, getting all that the traffic 
will bear, diminution of the productive effort, 
equating all in the union to a common level regard-
less of merit ••• 
ttThe word 1 union 1 also can mean something fine • • • 
it is not clear why we must assume that a much 
higher level group of professionals isi.bonnd:.to 
follow the labor union line simply because they 
have banded together to act collectively with their 
employers, or because they bear the sometimes unfor-
tunate name, 1union 1 •.• • It does not seem logical 
to assume that a professional engineer will act 
like a professional because he belongs to an 
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engineering society, but like a typical labor 
unionist if he also belongs to a professional 
bargaining group. From what the writer can 
learn about most of these groups, they have no 
intention of following the pattern set by the 
labor unions. Their objective is to deal with 
management on a rational, fair, cooperative, 
ethical, and professional level.u* 
The writer then contends that the idea of union-
ism should not be criticized because the engineering soci-
eties have not done much to advance the economic status of 
engineering employees. 
The·one basic fallacy of this theory lies in the 
assumption that union engineers will act in a professional 
manner. The past history of the engineering unions and the 
present increased interest of the trade unions have dis-
proven this concept. Engineers cannot expect to collective-
ly bargain with management on a cordial and dignified plane 
without resorting to typical union practices. Even the so-
called move back to upu.re professiona1•1 by such unions as the 
Engineers and Scientists of America will not preclude the use 
of standard bargaining tactics. It remains the policy of ESA 
that u ••• Economic weapons such as strikes shall be resorted 
*31, p. 389 
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to ••• when ••• other avenues toward settlement of the dif-
f'erences have been ••• explored and f'ound unworkable.u*" 
The point that the engineering societies have not 
done enough to raise the economic level of' the engineer is 
well taken. Since most of the societiest off'icials and 
spokesmen are in management's ranks, there is a definite 
conflict of' interest on this question. Furthermore, the old-
er and more influencial society members have been somewhat 
hesitant in considering the problems of the younger faction. 
This situation has given the engineering unions an ef'fective 
argument. As one union official commented: ~we must ••• ex-
post those employer-dominated groups who purport to speak for 
engineers ••• but who in reality speak f'or management. These 
groups, such as the National Society for Professional Engin-
eers, are controlled entirely by management people who are 
so f'ar removed from the engineering employee that they cannot 
possibly know his problems, his desires or his needs ••• tht9· 
In defense of the societies, it must be recognized that they 
cannot legally engage. in representing groups of employees. 
Any attempts in this direction would also cause a split in 
their diversified membership. 
The viewpoint of the engineering societies on the 
theory of unionism has generally ref'lected their opposition 
*33, p. 345 
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to this concept. The most widely publicized summation of 
these views is attributed to D. B. Sternman, founder and 
first president of one of the larger societies. In an article 
written some years ago he listed the following reasons why 
engineers should not join unions: 
nJ.. The usual methods of unions (coercion, strikes, 
picketing, closed shop, etc.) should be unthinkable 
in a profession. Such methods are inconsistent with 
all of the ethical ideals of a profession. 
2. Engineers occupy a position of confidence and 
trust between capital and labor, and between.em-
ployees and employers. Unionization is inconsistent 
with the highest discharge of that trust. 
3. Unionization places the sole emphasis on wages 
and hours, and on union membership, instead of em-
phasizing qualifications and quality of service. 
~. Unionism tends to pull all members of a profes-
sion down to the same level, discouraging individual 
effort, loyalty and ambition. 
5. Unionism is identified with the trades. Unioni-
zation of engineers undoes the work of years in win-
ning public recognition of engineering as a profes-
sion. 
6. Unionization is inconsistent with the professional 
spirit and attitude, which places service before 
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profit, the honor and standing of the profession 
before personal advantage, and the public welfare 
above all other considerations.tt* 
Whether or not these principles are sound depends 
not so much on theory as on actual incidents and develop-
ments since they were published. Although the events of re-
cent years have substantiated most of this reasoning, it 
would be unwise to assume that there is wide acceptance 
throughout the profession. The growth of the engineering 
unions proves this point. 
B. The Problem of Ethics 
It is often said that for a professional man to 
engage in union activities is a violation of the applicable 
code of ethics of that profession. However, the word Heth-
icsu is difficult to define and analyze in terms of general 
application since it is more a matter of spirit than the law. 
T.he definition is further complicated by difference in the 
working relationships of such professions as medicine and 
law, and that of engineering. For the purposes of this dis-
cussion, ethics may be defined as ua set of the rules-of-
the-gamet•under which engineers conduct their activities and 
earn their incomesn.** 
*33, P• 353 
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Practically all of the engineering societies have 
drawn up ethical codes in an attempt to embody into words 
the accepted concepts of high honor and integrity in the 
life and work of engineers as professional men. Much stress 
in these codes is laid on the confidential relationship of 
the engineer to his client or his employer. Based on these 
codes, many society members feel that the nature of their 
nconfidential relations" places them in direct opposition to 
unions. It should be noted here that the codes of the en-
gineering societies were formulated many years ago when the 
profession was relatively small and this direct relationship 
did exist. In many respects, they are no longer applicable 
to the large numbers of engineers employed in individual 
companies where this relationship is not in evidence. 
In discussing the problem of ethics and unionism, 
the engineering societies have been guided by the practices 
of the tttrue 11 professions. One of their leading spokesmen 
on ethics has written that lawyers are ethically prohibited 
from joining a labor union on the grounds that they cannot 
serve two masters.* This statement was vigorously disputed 
by the attorney for the Engineers and Scientists of America 
who responded that no known code of ethics of the legal pro-
fession prohibited such affiliation. In a further discussion, 
*2, p. 77 
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ESA officials said that many lawyers are, in fact, members of 
unions. This allegation referred to the fact that the "inte-
grated bar 11 , existing in some twenty-eight states, which re-
quires a lawyer to pay annual dues to the bar association, is 
a form of closed shop.* 
It would seem that the question of ethics still re-
mains to be resolved and will be influenced by future activi-
ties of both the societies and the unions. At this time, it 
is not reasonable to assume that membership in a collective 
bargaining organization constitutes a breach of ethics for 
the individual engineer. Nor is it sound to charge an en-
gineering union with unethical practices without sufficient 
reason. 
c. Professional Unitz 
A basic viewpoint of the engineering societies is 
that the profession must be unified if it is to survive. 
They see no conflict in the fact that some members become 
executives while others remain in the employee class. How-
ever, this concept is put to a severe strain when applied to 
engineering unions. The societies contend that the unions 
have fostered an "enemy'' theory within the profession -- the 
engineers who are part of management are the natural enemies 
of the unionized engineers.** Although this concept is 
*2, p. 77 
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somewhat strong, it is an accepted result o~ collective bar-
gaining. The union engineer cannot maintain a pro~essional 
relationship with llis associate in management and still 
maintain his bargaining status. 
This split in the pro~ession's ranks will grow as 
more engineers move into management. A survey o~ 900 top 
executives has disclosed that 45.5 per cent had a major edu-
cational background in science or engineering. Also, it has 
been estimated that ~orty per cent o~ all industrial execu-
tives are engineers.* 
Another ~actor involves the con~lict between the 
engineers who resist unionism and those who accept it. It 
is questionable whether these two groups can work together 
in a harmony o~ pro~essional attitude without a ~eeling o~ 
animosity regarding economic or pro~essional interest. For 
example, a ~ormer engineering employee of the Sperry Gyro-
scope Company commented that ~allowing the 1954 strike, there 
was a great deal o~ tension and ~riction between the strik-
ing engineers and those who remained at work.** 
Still another ~actor is concerned with the union's 
right to ~orce membership upon the engineer. Their position 
on compulsory unionism was made clear by one union o~~icial 
who said: 
*2, p. 75 
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"Some member units ••• have the union shop (where 
an employee is required to join the union within 
30 days to hold his job), that is the prerogative 
o~ the individual unit. We are not opposed to 
compulsory membership. tt* 
The union shop is a tactic common to most unions 
and is permitted under the Taft-Hartley Act. The engineer-
ing unions contend that those who share in the bene~its of 
union activity should pay their ~air share o~ the cost o~ 
that activity. The validity of the argument is open to ques-
tion. However, the ~act remains that engineers are being 
~orced to a~~iliate with unions against their will. A con-
tinuation o~ these and similar practices is bound to foment 
greater disunity in the profession. 
D. The Bene~its of Union Membership 
In our highly competitive society, e~perience has 
shown that some ~orm o~ collective action is necessary if 
any given group is to maintain its relative position. The 
labor union's method of collective bargaining has been estab-
lished on both legal and moral grounds, and has proved to be 
quite e~~ective. In spite o~ his pro~essional standing, the 
engineer is not different than any other employee with regard 
to the desire to improve his economic status. However, 
*27, p. 22 
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unlike most of his fellow employees, he lacks the necessary 
experience required to achieve this goal. Except in isolated 
cases, engineers have not as yet developed a successful 
method of solving economic problems which even approximates 
the effectiveness of collective bargaining under the Taft-
Hartley Act. 
In general, the demands and the collective agree-
ments of engineering unions do not differ materially from 
those of other unions. With certain exceptions, the emphasis 
is on wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. In wage matters, the engineering unions have succeeded 
in raising the general salary level by negotiating minimum 
rates. The salary levelling problem, which has plagued the 
older engineers, has been corrected by provisions covering 
job classification systems, percentagewise salary increases, 
and salary inequity adjustments. 
The engineering unions have also taken steps to in-
sure the professional status of their members. They have 
negotiated provisions covering such items as employer pay-
ment for professional society dues, employer-paid time off 
for engineers to attend meetings of their professional soci-
eties, and employer-paid tuition for advanced degrees. 
Engineers generally feel that they should share the 
benefits of an invention or technique developed on company 
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time and property. Union contracts provide for patent agree-
ments covering monetary payments. 
The differential between engineers and production 
workers regarding paid holidays and vacations has largely 
been wiped out. Engineers get a slightly larger number of 
paid holidays, and get their two weeks' vacations much 
sooner. Under some contracts, they also get three and four 
weeks' vacations.* 
Perhaps the most important benefit of unionism is 
concerned with the engineer's right to seek redress for his 
complaints. Engineering unions have invar1ably insured this 
right through the establishment of grievance procedures which 
may range from a one-step procedure to the multistep proce-
, 
dure with arbitration. 
E. Do Engineers Want a Union? 
Perhaps the most important question in analyzing 
the past and future developments of engineering unionism, is 
concerned with the desire of engineers for union affiliation. 
Many surveys have been conducted in an attempt to look into 
the minds of engineers to find out how they feel about col-
lective bargaining. In weighing the validity of these sur-
veys, it is important to keep in mind the influence of age, 
*?, p. 16 
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experience and degree of supervisory responsibility. Younger 
engineers are more inclined than their elders to favor col-
1ective bargaining. In addition, the existence of bias must 
be recognized, depending on the type of organization report-
ing. 
In 1953, the American Society of Civil Engineers 
surveyed* 17,203 of its members on the question of unionism. 
Of those reporting, 63 per cent were opposed to collective 
bargaining. In this group, 58 per cent were opposed because 
of incompatibility with professional status while 6 per cent 
were opposed for other reasons. Twenty four per cent of re-
porting members believed that collective bargaining would be 
advantageous. Of this total, an overwhelming majority -
3,881 to 169 - said that they would prefer representation by 
a professional bargaining group to affiliation with a craft 
or labor unit. The most surprising result of this survey was 
that nearly half of the 6,743 older engineers were not op-
posed to collective bargaining. 
Another survey*'' by the Professional Engineerst 
Conference Board for Industry, covered 1,4oo engineers em-
ployed in industry, mostly in the younger age bracket (aver-
age age 35). This group, in which unionism has its greatest 
*26, p. 28 
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potential appeal, was asked the question: ''Do you believe en-
gineers' interests are strengthened economically or otherwise 
by membership in a collective bargaining organization?tt Sixty 
per cent answered trnott, and thirty :four per cent "yesu. It 
is significant that the opinion o:f the pro-union group, was 
:formed in most cases by those without any actual experience 
with a labor organization. Only about six per cent were em-· 
ployed in plants which had collective bargaining organizations 
:for engineers. Of that relatively insignificant number, only 
half belonged to the union. A large percentage o:f the engin-
eers that answered in the negative indicated their emphatic 
disapproval with exclamation points and penciled comments on 
their questionaires. 
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O:f the more than 200 ~mpanies covered in the survey, 
only eight per cent reported they had been the targets o:f any 
organizational activity. Of the executives who said their 
plants had been the scene of union activity, twenty-nine per 
cent said such activity had affected them adversely with res-
pect to their ability to recruit and hold competent engineer-
ing personnel. This was particularly true, they said, of recent 
college graduates, few o:f whom would take employment with a 
unionized plant. 
The broadest survey* was conducted by the American 
Institute of Electrical Engineers and covered 24,769 society 
*21, p. 97 
members of which 57 ~er cent were in the 20 - 4cr year age 
bracket. When asked about their need for collective bargain-
ing as an employee, 19 per cent replied in the affirmative. 
In a similar query, 28 per cent expressed the need for col-
lective bargaining regardless or employment status. on an-
other question, 29 per cent of those reporting disagreed 
with the statement that the individual responsibility and 
independent judgment required of an engineer are incompatible 
with unionism. Only about 1,200 engineers claimed union 
membership and an additional 650 say they were represented 
by a union. Since a large portion or this society's member-
ship is employed in the aircraft and electronics industries, 
this survey has special significance. 
other engineering societies have, and will continue 
to conduct similar surveys in an attempt to determine the 
attitude of the profession on the question of unionism. How-
ever, it would be unwise to place too much emphasis on these 
surveys for a number of reasons. First, the wording of the 
questions is sometimes ambiguous and may lead to erroneous 
conclusions. Furthermore, most engineers have not had any 
actual experience with labor unions and, in m~y rrases, have 
not given the matter any serious thought. Finally, there is 
the influence of the widely publicized theory that it is 
possible to have "professionalu unions. 
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VII. THE MINNEAPOLIS-HONEYWELL CASE 
A. What Happened 
The Minneapolis-Honeywell case is included in this 
study because it represents one of the first major tests of 
unionization among engineers. The results and implications 
of this case are so significant that they will materially 
effect the course of engineering unionism in the years to 
come. 
In this nationally important utest casett, the en-
gineers at Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company voted in 
May 1957 to reject unionization by both the United Auto 
Workers and the Engineers and Scientists of America. They 
also rejected grouping with technicians in a single bargain-
ing unit. In addition to the two unions, the company and an 
organized fldecertificationt1 group of non-union engineers were 
involved in the complex battle.* 
With 1,451 eligible to vote in the engineers' unit, 
the vote was a strong 896 for ttneither uniontt, against 314 
for UAW and 197 for the independent ESA.** 
The election results dealt the unions a severe 
blow. ESA had represented Honeywell engineers for 10 years 
*16, p. 88 
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through an affiliated unit that had helped charter the parent 
organization.* UAW had started an all-out campaign to or-
ganize white collar employees and Honeywell was to be an im-
portant factor in setting up a professional division. 
The results were highly gratifying to company 
management. Seizing the opportunity they organized an effec-
tive campaign with the help of non-union engineers. 
B. Events Leading to Election 
Engineering unionism within the company began about 
10 years ago when three groups of engineers with divergent 
opinions formed a local unit known as the Federation of 
Honeywell Engineers. The first group were labor unionists 
in the traditional sense, had CIO affiliation ready to go in 
1945, and would have taken engineers into the trade union 
movement. The second group were those with many complaints 
against the company who wanted some organization to speak 
for them but did not want full fledged trade unionism. The 
third group were essentially anti-union but under the terms 
of the then-in-force Wagner Act, which did not protect pro-
fessionals from inclusion in production unions, felt they had 
to organize a local federation to prevent being swept into 
a CIO union.** 
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The Federation was regarded in the plant, at first, 
as management-favored, not a company union, but one tacitly 
approved to keep the production workers' union from estab-
lishing a beach head among pro-union employees at the profes-
sional level. As a result of management 1 s influence, the 
Federation was weak and did little to further the interests 
of its members •. Soon after, however, it helped form the 
Engineers and Scientists of America and the Hmflitantu 
unionists gained more control.* 
After a 1954 acceptance of a tttake it or leave itn 
offer from Honeywell, the union went downhill pretty fast --
only a maintenance-of-membership clause kept it from probable 
dissolution. The president resigned, and for a time the 
union floundered about, without any effective leadership. 
Eventually, under a new and more experienced president, the 
union was rebuilt.** 
During May 1955, the Federation struck when bargain-
ing with management became deadlocked over a demand for a 
wage increase. The effectiveness of the strike was greatly 
diminished by the refusal of the trade unions, representing 
other workers in the plant, to recognize the engineers• 
picket lines. After one week, the engineers returned to 
*11, p .. 168 
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work on management terms, although a substantial union block 
wanted to prolong the strike. In a "face savingu gesture, 
union officers said that the purpose of the strike had been 
achieved through a strong demonstration of dissatisfaction 
against the company's "inflexible, intransigent attitudeu 
against the union.* 
After the unsuccessful strike, the UAW tried to 
gain a foothold. There had been a growing movement within 
the Federation against ESA' s emphasis on 11pure professional-
ismu. Union officials wanted a broader base of membership 
than ESA believed in -- specifically, the inclusion of tech-
nicians. They also called for umore muscleu to further the 
best interests of members which the UAW could supply. How-
ever, the proposal to withdraw from ESA lost by a narrow 
margin. Although the vote was 3-to-2 for leaving ESA, it 
fell short of the necessary two-thirds majority.** 
~AW made another bid for representation in Febru-
ary,l957. This time, the auto union sent Jack Conway, a per-
sonal aide to president Walter Reuther, to conduct the cam-
As a result of this action and the growing resent-paign. 
ment against the parent organization, Federation engineers 
d . . UAW *** voted (579-116) to disaffiliate with ESA an JOJ.n • · 
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Immediately after the decision was announced, non-
union engineers formed a committee for the purpose of decer-
tifying the Federation. After receiving more than the 30 
per cent 11 show of interestn·legally required, they petitioned 
the National Labor Relations Board :for a decertification 
election. The company also petitioned :for an election on 
the grounds of not knowing with whom they should bargain.* 
An election order by the NLRB marked the beginning 
of intensive campaigning by all the factions involved. The 
UAW depended largely on leaflets and mailings, but also used 
group meetings in their campaign. The auto union :figured at 
the start it had to pick up only 100 more votes to win, but 
it didn't relax.** 
ESA conducted a similar type campaign, but against 
U'AW and "no uniontt. Their slogan was, fiA vote :for no union 
is a vote for UAW".* 
A more intensive and strongly conducted campaign 
was waged by the company. Three days after all sides agreed 
to an election, J. H. Binger, Honeywell vice-president, sent 
the following memo to all engineering and technical super-
visors: 
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nwe think the time has come to take the handcuffs 
off by doing everything we legally can to stop 
UAW from tying our hands again with an industrial-
type, factory-minded, anti-company union. We 
don't intend to pull any punches, but will stick 
strictly to the truth. You are a basic part of' 
this total program, and this memo is intended to 
help you be more ef'f'ecti ve in this campaign. tt* 
The basic technique employed by the company placed 
the burden of persuasion and argument principally in the 
hands of the supervisors. Because of' the nature o.f the pro-
fessional work, each had an intimate, personal relationship 
with subordinates. Supervisors were asked to discuss the 
question of unionism openly with ttworking level II engineers 
when the subject came up during everyday activities or at 
social gatherings. However, they were cautioned to be on 
guard against stepping over the line that separates persua-
sion .from coercion -- which is illegal under the Taft-Hartley 
Act. The company also furnished supervisors with a notebook 
of company arguments for its pay program, hiring policy, pro-
motions, merit increases and other ttpro.fessionalu benefits, 
and against UAW on grounds o.f strike violence, political ac-
tion, and policies which the company said place the auto 
workers in ~'~an ideological s·traight-jacketu. * 
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In addition to the supervisors, top executives were 
asked to help. Those with a direct relationship to engineers 
placed the company's views before small groups and partici-
pated in question-and-answer sessions. And, in the crucial 
week before the vote, Paul B. Wishart, Honeywell president, 
sent employees a letter pledging ttthe best and soundest rela-
tionshiptt should unionism be rejected - but bargaining in 
good faith if it won.* 
C. Interpretations and Implications of Results 
The results of NLRB election at Minneapolis Honey-
well have prompted divergent comment by a number of sources. 
In a copyrighted story, staff writer Sam Romer of the Minne-
apolis Tribune interpreted the results this way: 
t1The crushing majorities by which engineering and 
technical personnel at Minneapolis Honeywell Regu-
lator Company buried union hopes last week may mark 
the beginning of a new chapter in American labor 
relations. 
tton the union side,· it may force a thorough re-
thinking of the approach to white-collar organi-
zation -- a second look at the problems in winning 
engineers and technicians (key workers in an auto-
mated industry) over to collective bargaining. 
*1.0, p. 160 
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"On the management side, it may provide other com-
panies with a successful formula to withstand union 
assaults against unorganized employees. 11* 
The strong repudiation of the collective bargain-
ing concept by Honeywell engineers was most damaging to the 
power and prestige of the Engineers and Scientists of 
America. After ten years of organization and investment, 
ESA had lost one of its oldest and largest affiliated unions. 
Although successful in a drive for "pure professionalismtt, 
to exclude technicians from engineering bargaining units, the 
union apparently underestimated the ability of the company 
to wage an intensive campaign. 
This reasoning was advanced by ESA 1 s president 
.Joseph Amann, who attributed the results to a Upowerful anti-
union campaign" put on by the Honeywell company. In comment-
ing on the election, he estimated that ESA lost approximate-
ly 70 p:er cent of its votes to 11no union" in the last ten 
days prior to the election. During this period, he said, 
the company uromancedtt its employees, sent them letters 
about a "wonderful dreamland" and threw a lavish party.**' 
.John Taft, vice president, used much stronger 
language to describe the outcome. In private questioning, 
*15, P• 316 
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after speaking before the New York section of the American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers, he said that the Minneapolis 
affair was a plain and simple case of Utmion bustingff on the 
part of the company.* On the surface, this statement might 
lead some observers to conclude that the company was guilty 
of unfair labor practices. To date, however, there is no 
record of any complaint proceedings initiated by the union 
to support this conclusion. 
Because of the damaging precedent set by Honeywell 
engineers, the future growth of ESA will be seriously im-
paired. The union must expect and meet the challenge of 
representation by other companies as soon as existing collec-
tive bargaining contracts expire. Therefore, a strengthen-
ing of present position will be its main task. This will un-
doubtedly lead to more intensive (and expensive) campaigns 
to match those of the larger companies. 
The election results also stymied the United Auto 
Workers in its drive to organize the country's white-collar 
workers. Earlier this year the auto union set up a new pro-
fessional department known as the Aircraft and Avionics En-
gineering Council and counted on the Honeywell group as its 
nucleus. At the union's Atlantic City convention, WAW 
officers stressed the importance of a Honeywell victory as 
*15' p. 316 
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the opening of a national campaign for engineers, scientists, 
and professional workers.* 
Commenting on the situation, two union officials 
expressed different views. ~ames Stern, the UAW organizer in 
charge of the Minneapolis campaign, said the vote indicated 
11we are living in an age of conservatism -- and engineers 
reflect this 11 .** This philisophical statement, however pro-
found, does not explain the causes of the auto union's defeat. 
A more realistic comment was made by Everett Taft, president 
of the deposed UAW local, who said, 11We took a classic drub-
bingu, and blamed the result on the "free-speechn provisions 
of the Taft-Hartley Act which he denounced as permitting the 
~ompany to influence the results of the voting.** 
Unlike ESA, the auto union wanted the technicians 
to be included in the same bargaining unit as the engineers. 
It had expected a close victory among engineers and an easy 
one in the technical unit. In any event, the UAW felt that 
the technicians' vote would carry the election. Because of 
the previous decision by the Honeywell union to affiliate, 
it apparently did not foresee the resulting split in bargain-
ing units. 
*10, p. 159 
**15, p. 316 
93 
In the light of the Honeywell decision, the auto 
union must revise its plans for organizing the nation's en-
gineers. Possibly, the separation of the engineer and other 
professionals from the organizational concepts applied to 
the white-collar office workers would be in order. The elec-
tion has proven that the union's present policies and prac-
tices are outdated with respect to the organization of the 
professional. Furthermore, the UAW must recognize manage-
ment's increasing interest in the problem and can expect 
future opposition similar to that encountered in the unioni-
zation of production workers. 
Considering the carefully planned, strongly con-
ducted campaign, the company's victory wa~ not surprising. 
Management's effort, however, was directed mainly against in-
dustrial type unionism. Had the UAW not been involved in 
the battle, it is highly probable that representation by EBA 
would have cuntinued. In a sense, the auto union's bid for 
recognition forced management to actively consider the plight 
of the engineer. 
Company spokesmen were somewhat cautious in their 
post-election statements. Glenn E. Seidel, ~oneywell's vice 
president in_charge of engineering, said the election results 
mean Nwe can all work together to build the best possible 
future for both the company and our people•'.* Another exe-
cutive said, 1'We 1ve got loose· ends to wrap up so we can 
chart a new management course. This is the first time in 
ten years we haven't had a union.u** Reading between the 
lines, the company wants to maintain and possibly improve 
the conditions that pro~pted the engineers to turn the unions 
out. 
Undoubtedly, other companies employing large num-
bers of engineers will employ similar methods in combating 
the growth of engineering unionism. It may be unwise, how-
ever, to expect this formula to be successful for all compan-
ies. Individual situations will require thorough investiga-
tion and varying approaches. Nor can it be assumed that union 
strategy will remain constant. In short, management cannot 
afford to relax on the basis of a single victory. 
Apart from the company's effort, the role of the 
''decertification If group was vi tal to the outcome of the elec-
tion. Here again, the opposition was directly attributed to 
UAW intervention. The committee readily admitted that the 
Federation of Honeywell Engineers owed its existence through 
the years to "neutrali tytt and ttpassivenessH on the part of 
about 1000 non-union people.*** The proppect of trade 
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unionism had apparently forced this group to act. A member 
of the committee summed up this feeling when he remarked, 
ttCollective bargaining tactics, methods and viewpoint, as ex-
emplified by UAW, are not wanted by engineers and scientists. 
It is not the way we want to deal with our employees.u* 
Former members of the union express a similar re-
sentment for trade-union type of representation. They felt 
that the turning point occurred when the more militant group 
took over the Federation and headed toward CIO-AFL affilia-
tion. Perhaps most important was the simple fact that there 
were legitimate gripes in the beginning against the company, 
but company policy had improved greatly over the last years. 
Some engineers said simply, 11We had a change of viewpoint 
after the union had been with us a while. u And, trwe organized 
our opposition.u** 
Some engineering society officials, taking a rather 
broad view, interpreted the election result as a victory for 
professionalism over unionism. The incompatibility of these 
factions had long been the policy of organizations such as 
the National Society of Professional Engineers. Commenting 
on the situation, Robert J. Rhinehart, president of NSPE, had 
this to say: 
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11It is our sincere hope that what happened at 
Minneapolis after a long and hard struggle will 
dispel once and for all the idea that some may 
still have that professional engineers of this 
nation will ever adopt a concept alien and antag-
onistic to their professional obligations and 
ideals. 11* 
This statement is somewhat optimistic, and not com-
' 
pletely warranted in the light of facts of the case. By 
their own admission, Honeywell engineers rejected the union 
because of the threat of trade unionism and improved company 
policy. There is little evidence to indicate that profes-
sional obligation materially affected the thinking of these 
engineers. Nor can it be assumed that the collective bar-
gaining concept has been irrevocably repudiated. Should con-
ditions deteriorate again to a point where there is wide.-..... 
spread dissatisfaction, it is conceivable that the engineers 
would form an organization similar to the deposed union. 
*24-, p. 118 
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VIII. THE MANAGEMENT VIEWPOINT 
A. Management's Objectives 
The primary objective of management is profit. 
Under our system of free enterprise, the management that 
doesn't produce a profit cannot long survive. The only rea-
son stockholders make funds available is to gain a return on 
these funds. Being directly responsible to the investors, 
management's job is to produce this return by the proper uti-
lization of labor, materials and facilities. 
The attainment of this goal is also the responsi-
bility of the engineer, as it is for all employees. Every 
contribution that the engineer ean make toward helping man-
agement strengthen the corporation's profit position makes 
the engineer a more valuable man in the eyes of management 
and enhances the engineer's role in corporate affairs. How-
ever, the engineer is not always aware of this point. The 
fact that he is hired to help do a job in the best way, at 
the lowest cost and in the shortest possible time, sometimes 
escapes the engineer. It is questionable whether this is a 
result of a limited business background, improper company in-
doctrination, or a superiority complex. In any ease, the lack 
of understanding has often led to reduced profits and discon-
tented engineers.· 
Management's second objective is to satisfy cus-
tomers. This is necessary since it is the basis on which pro-
fits are built. Here is where the engineer's training should 
make him management• s right hand man. He must shoulder most 
of the responsibility for the product and therefore the cus-
tomer's satisfaction. Company reputations are built with a 
good product as the cornerstone. Over the long run, a sound 
competitive product will determine success or failure. By 
accepting this burden and proving his ability to do the job, 
the engineer can assume one of the key roles in company 
affairs. 
The third objective of management is to satisfy 
the employees, and everybody -- including the co+.-P9Xat;io.J;t 
:...\.;.-~~ • :-... A::/. 
officers -- is an employee of the stockholders~;:· Here .agai;l.-,~ 
....... :" . .-
"_·?-": ,.._ ~ ~ : 
the profit motive is evident. It has become 1f!.crea.~n_gly ~ 
-·.... - > : 
clear that a company• s greatest asset is its hnor -i'o.tce. _.:-
·7,;_-~r. ._ :_~ ~-~-~-~ 
Management protects this asset by providing satis~~Y · 
salaries, benefits, working conditions, etc. It also recog-
nizes the additional needs of the engineer, such as profes-
sional development and recognition. 
B. Company 1":A11*' 
Company tt:A_!l is a nationally known manufacturer of 
communications equipment with facilities located throughout 
*49 
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the country. The particular plant visited employed some 6800 
people, of which approximately 2·50 are engineers. Mr. J"ones 
('fictitious name), Superintendent of Industrial and Labor 
Relations, was the person interviewed. 
The interview was somewhat restricted because the 
representative status of the engineer's union was currently 
being reviewed by the National Labor Relations Board. As Mr. 
J"ones remarked in his letter,* tt~ •• because of this, we feel 
that any discussions in this field must, of necessity, be 
quite limited in their scope.tt This position was understand-
able since a full discussion of the problem could conceivably 
jeopardize the company1 s position. It is felt, however, that 
this restriction did not significantly detract from the val-
ue of the information obtained. 
The history of the engineer's union dates back to 
early 1952 when it was organized. The first contract with 
the company was negotiated in J"une of that year. When asked 
why the engineers felt it necessary to organize, Mr. J"ones 
was somewhat at a loss for an explanation. He did not readi-
ly attribute this action to the generally accepted areas of 
dissatisfaction such as financial, professional and personal 
treatment. Rather, he was of the opinion that the cause lay 
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in the •1trend of the times u, obviously referring to the grow-
ing force of collective action in the country. In defense 
of this statement, Mr. Jones cited the 11above averagett per-
sonnel policies and practices of the company. Without de-
tailed knowledge of these policies and practices, this line 
of reasoning could be regarded as management propaganda. 
However, there is one well known substantiating factor; 
Company 11Att has a widespread reputation as a pioneer in the 
field of human relations. 
At the time of organization, the union membership 
included both professionals and sub-professionals. The bar-
gaining unit encompassed all of the company facilities and 
was certified by the NLRB. The number of dues-paying mem-
bers was difficult to estimate because only a portion of the 
dues were collected by means of a f1checkoff systemtt (by which 
union dues are deducted from employees' paychecks by the em-
ployer). 
Late in 1952, the union combined with several other 
independent unions to form the Engineers and Scientists of 
America. During the next three years, the union negotiated 
an annual contract with the company. Labor relations were 
described as good throughout this period. Mr. Jones commented 
on the high plane of negotiation which he attributed to the 
above average intelligence of engineers and their logical 
approach to problems. The majority of grievances were 
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adequately handled by first-line engineering supervision. 
Effectiveness in dealing with grievances was enhanced by 
means of a supervisory training program. 
Just before the third contract expired in November 
of 1955, professionalism became an important issue within 
the rank and file of the union. In an apparent attempt to 
gain a greater degree of professional recognition, a group 
of engineers launched a campaign to exclude sub-professionals 
from membership. This action had a disasterous effect on 
union activities.. As a result, the union has operated with-
out a contract since 1955. Recently, the NLRB was petitioned 
to redefine the bargaining unit and, presumably, to resolve 
the question of representation. 
Mr. Jones said that the ~mpany was actively en-
gaged in the hearings before the NLRB. Since the situation 
afforded the company an opportunity to defeat the union, he 
was questioned on management tactics. In somewhat of an 
understatement, he replied that the company was involved 
nnot for the express desire of defeating the union, but pri-
marily to present the factsu. Engineering supervision as-
sisted in presenting the company's viewpoint internally. 
They were being kept up-to-date on the hearings and were en-
couraged to discuss the issues with their subordinates when 
questioned. 
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According to Mr. dones, the state of flux that 
existed prevented a clear evaluation as to the eventual out-
come of the hearings. He stated that the company would ac-
cept the decision of the NLRB and, if the union was success-
ful, management would continue to bargain in good faith. In 
addition, be predicted good future relations with the union. 
Turning to the subject of the union•s effect on 
company operations, Mr. dones noted only one significant 
problem. The company found it difficult to fill some "bor-
derlinetl engineering positions because of a dispute over 
qualifications. The union insisted that these positions be 
filled by personnel holding accredited engineering degrees 
while the company felt that this requirement was not manda-
tory. Mr. dones said that this situation complicated re-
cruiting and resulted in rejection of qualified personnel. 
His personal feeling on this point was emphasized when he com-
mented, u ••• a man fit for any job should get ittt. 
In general, the presence of the union did not ham-
per organizational changes. The company promoted from within 
the union ranks and was successful in this practice. As an 
example, Mr. dones cited one department head who was former-
ly an aggressive union official. on many occasions, this en-
gineer was involved in ttheated u discussions with management. 
Despite this forceful union viewpoint, the company recognized 
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his supervisory potential and promoted him. He is now re-
garded as a trusted member of the management team. 
Strong company loyalty also helped counteract the 
effects of unionism. Nor was this loyalty restricted to non-
union engineers. Mr. Jones remarked that union officials 
often recommended the company to job-seeking friends and 
relatives. On occasion, he was asked about personnel open-
ings by an official following a meeting in which company 
working conditions, wage scales, etc. were soundly denounced. 
T.he next general area of discussion was concerned 
with the engineer's difficiencies and their possible rela-
tion to his discontent. Some executives believe that to a 
great extent, the problem stems from such factors as the 
lack of a broad background and a preoccupation with money. 
Mr. Jones disputed this theory. However, he agreed that a 
broad background was desirable and emphasiged the fact that 
the primary requirements of industry dictated the need for 
specialized training and experience. on the question of 
money, he concluded that the engineer's attitude was typi-
cal. He dismissed this point with the comment, ttWho isn•t 
preoccupied with moneytt. 
Mr. Jones described engineers as individualists 
and therefore, unlike the average employee. He felt that 
their specialized scientific training led them to the 
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analysis of every problem in a "black is black, white is 
whitett manner. However, as professional employees, they were 
entitled to special treatment. For instance, they should not 
be required to punch a time clock because their work cannot 
be measured to any degree. The creative nature of their 
work also requires the delegation of a great deal of respon-
sibility to engineers. In addition, fringe benefits for pro-
fessional advancement are necessary to the enhancement of 
the engineer•s value to his company. 
The questioning was then directed to the overall 
subject of engineering unionism. Specifically, Mr. Jones 
was asked whether the engineer should engage in collective 
bargaining. While agreeing in principle to unionism, he did 
not believe that such action was the answer to the engineer's 
dissatisfaction. This was based in part on the reasoning 
that the gains made by Company_ ttAtt engineers would have been 
forthcoming in the long run without collective bargaining. 
However, he did admit that engineering unionism had done some 
good in pin pointing outmoded company practices. 
Mr. 3ones discounted the need for a national engin-
eering society such as the American Medical Association or 
the American Bar Association, to promote the economic and 
pro~essional status of the engineer. Furthermore, he doubted 
whether this type of organization could exist in the light of 
the engineer 1 s individualistic nature and company loyalty. 
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In conclusion, Mr. Jones commented that engineer-
ing unionism is an important and complex problem. Intensive 
investigation by management is necessary to determine the 
cause and effect of this movement. He stated that his com-
pany would undertake such. a study in the near future. 
c. Company 11B11* 
Company tiBtl is one of the largest organizations 
engaged in industrial and military construction. In addition 
to a home office and seven branch offices located within the 
United States, it maintains an extensive overseas operation. 
Since activities are restricted primarily to the engineering 
and supervision of construction, the labor :force is relative-
ly small. The company employs some 660 people of which ap-
proximately 60 were field personnel. The organization o:f 
the home o:ffice consisted o:f an engineering division, design 
division, and the normal sta:f:f departments. O:f the 365 en-
gineers employed, 300 are assigned to the engineering divi-
sion while the remainder are members o:f the design division. 
An additional 135 sub-professional draftsmen and designers 
work in the design division. 
Mr. Smith (:fictitious name), the interviewee, is 
Assistant Personnel Manager. He had recently assumed his 
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present position arter a long tenure with the company as a 
rield engineer. Although unique in personnel work, this en-
gineering experience provided rirst hand knowledge of the 
problems of engineering unionism. The ability to accurately 
analyze the attitude of company engineers enhanced the value 
of the information obtained. 
The engineering union at Company HBII is a local of 
the American Federation of Technical Engineers (AFL-CIO). 
Membership in this union is not restricted to engineers, but 
includes individuals employed in the general technical and 
scientiric field of engineering. The bargaining unit was 
restricted to the technical personnel in the company's design 
division. The actual number of dues-paying engineers was un-
known to Mr. Smith; he felt that the majority were active 
members. 
The union was organized in 1946 for what Mr. Smith 
described as tty:urely economic reasonstt. Since the majority 
of membership is sub-professional, this reasoning appears to 
be consistent with that found in trade unionism. However, 
it was pointed out that some engineers were also dissatis-
fied with their economic treatment and were not forced into 
collective bargaining against their will. When quiried on 
financial treatment and other causes of discontent, Mr. Smith 
was of the opinion that company policies were 11 e:x:tremely fa-
vorableu. Extensive studies were cited to prove this p:oint. 
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Here again, there exists the problem of evaluating a state-
ment concerning the relative standing of a company•s policies. 
Labor relations were described as satisfactory 
throughout the history of the union. According to Mr. Smith, 
grievances were both minor and infrequent. An atmosphere of 
Ugive and taket' prevailed during annual negotiations. He 
also stated that company operations are not unduly restricted 
by the existence of the union. While union approval was re-
quired for the assignment of some personnel, management has 
always come to an agreement with union officials. In addi-
tion, no stigma is attached to union membership, and advance-
ment is based solely on merit. Mr. Smith noted several high-
level supervisors who were formerly active unionists. 
The relationship of unionism to the training and 
the ability of company engineers was also emphasized by Mr. 
Smith. The company maintains a training program for inex-
perienced graduate engineers in which the trainees are ro-
tated among the various operating divisions. Each trainee 
starts as a member of a surveying team at once of the project 
sites. Aside from the technical advantages, this practice 
removed the •top::en minded tt beginner f~om the sphere of union 
influence. Although Mr. Smith felt that these engineers were 
ttnot enthusiastic about unionismu, he admitted that this 
practice gave the company an excellent opportunity to 
108 
indoctrinate the trainees. The scope o:f this indoctrination 
was not clearly defined, but the promotion o:f company loyal-
ty was apparently one o:f its objectives. 
Mr. Smith also believed that only the mediocre en-
gineers who lacked initiative and ambition were union mem-
bers. Rather than relying on their own ability, they used 
the union as a 11crutchn. He stated that the absence o:f union-
ism within the engineering division was proof o:f this state-
ment. These higher level engineers had consistently rejected 
collective bargaining even during periods o:f great pressure 
:from AFTE organizers. Mr. Smith attributed this to the 
ability o:f the better engineer to recognize the inherent 
disadvantages o:f unionism as related to professional and eco-
nomic advancement. However, this whole argument is not as 
sound as it appears to be. It was stressed earlier in the 
interview that the company hired only engineers of the highest 
calibre. The policy was not restricted to recruiting for the 
engineering and field divisions. It is inconceivable, there-
fore, that the design division was completely staffed with 
11mediocreu engineers. In addition, the advancement o:f engin-
eers :from the union ranks decidedly reflects company confi-
dence in their ability. 
Mr. Smith summarized his views on unionism by stat-
ing that it did not benefit the company or the individual 
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engineer. Union doctrine was in direct conrlict with company 
loyalty which he said was the ttmost important ractor in the 
company's success 11 • For the engineer, the union could give 
nothing more than a sense of false security. When ques-
tioned rurther, however, Mr. Smith reluctantly admitted that 
union members had faired better economically than non-members. 
Another part of the discussion also revealed that membership 
was increasing at a signiricant rate. When pressed for an 
explanation, Mr. Smith commented on the temporary nature of 
these conditions. Notwithstanding this derense, it is ~p­
parent that the benefits of unionism in Company "Btf are quite 
tangible. 
TUrning to the problems of the proression, Mr. 
Smith was concerned with the narrow background or engineers. 
While no connection between this condition and unionism was 
made, he did reel that it was responsible for some discon-
tent. Criticism of this shortcoming was directed mainly at 
the concentrated technical ciriculum in our engineering 
c-olleges. Conceding that four years was a relatively short 
training period, he suggested that these institutions offer 
five or six year programs. The additional time would allow 
the teaching or non-technical subjects and would assure the 
engineering graduate of a well-rounded education. Mr. Smith 
noted that this solution would not only broaden the engineer's 
outlook but provide greater opportunity for advancement. 
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At the elose of the interview, Mr. Smith was ques-
tioned on the desirability of a national society to promote 
the eeonomic and professional status- of engineers. His an-
swer was that the disadvantag.es of such an organization 
would outweigh the advantages to both the engineer and his 
employer. One disadvantage he cited was the restriction of 
individual bargaining rights which are extremely important 
to the majority of engineers. Another disadvantage con-
sidered was the undesirable public attitude toward a profes-
sional uunion-typeu organization. Mr. Smith was further con-
cerned about the conflict of interests resulting for manage-
ment membership. 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS 
A. General Comment 
There are indications that the trend towards union-
ism among engineers has been reversed. The AFL-CIO's initial 
attempt to organize the professional has failed. Indepen-
dent union engineers are beginning to disassociate themselves 
from sub-professional members, either to form professional 
organizations or to reject collective bargaining completely. 
These factors apparently stem from the engineer's conviction 
that trade unionism is not the proper solution. However, 
the possible future growth of unionism in the engineering 
profession cannot be underestimated. The AFL-CIO can be ex-
pected to increase its effort to organize engineers as part 
of the uwhi te-collartt movement. And, future labor legisla-
tion could make this task a great deal easier. 
Unionism, in the engineering profession, whatever 
its connotation, is not the key issue to be considered. It 
cannot be regarded simply as collective action being a trend 
of the times. Rather, unionism among engineers is primarily 
a manifestation of the more important underlying problem of 
discontent involving financial, professional and personal 
treatment. The existence of this discontent continues to 
threaten our country's defense and economy. Yet, the various 
factions involved have accomplished little towards an 
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understanding and solution of this problem. Disunity ob-
structs the progress of the engineering societies, management 
is generally apathetic, and the engineer remains frustrated 
and bewildered. Although the problem is complex, it certain-
ly warrants greater recognition and study. 
It is firmly believed that the engineer can exist 
both as an industrial employee and a professional. The at-
tainment or this status will require the close cooperation of 
the engineering societies, industry, and the engineers. Each 
of these groups must accept the challenge and the associated 
responsibility. 
B. The Engineering Societies• Responsibility 
T,he majority of responsibility for the advancement 
of the profession rests with the engineering societies. Their 
concern for technical progress should not overshadow the need 
for protecting the engineer's welfare. In short, practical-
ly every aspect of the engineer's life that effects his pro-
fessional standing must be considered the domain of the soci-
eties. This is particularly evident in the case of economic 
status. While it is not implied that the societies should 
engage in collective bargaining, there is an obligation to 
insure equitable financial treatment. 
The engineering societies also have the responsi-
bility of solving the problem of professional unity. The 
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governing boards and members of these individual organiza-
tions should set aside their differences for the common 
cause. This_move would benefit not only the profession but 
the public in general through the establishment of standards 
of ethical conduct, rigid requirements for membership, and 
other desirable policies. Consideration should be given to 
the formation of a parent organization patterned after the 
American Medical Association and the American Bar Associa-
tion. Such a plan would certainly enhance the professional 
status of the engineer. 
The efforts of the engineering societies to encour-
age professional development of the membership and to promote 
public recognition of the professional character of the en-
gineer's work should be expanded. For example, official 
statements should be adopted for membership and public infor-
mation With respect to unionism and other important issues. 
The societies should acquaint the individual engineer with 
the pertinent provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. Further-
more, they should be prepared to combat future attempts to 
legislate any labor laws that are detrimental to the profes-
sion. 
The engineering societies have the additional res-
ponsibility for the training and professional attitude of the 
student engineer. They should give greater importance to the 
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accreditation of educational institutions. The inclusion of 
non-technical subjects in the engineering ciricul:em also re-
quires further study. Finally, the societies should provide 
guidance and assistance to education institutions confronted 
with problems regarding professional training. 
c. Management 1 s Responsibility 
Management must recognize that the engineer is dif-
ferent from the clerical or production employee. This does 
not mean that the engineer should be coddled, but simply that 
industry should be aware of his unique position as a profes-
sional employee. 
While financial remuneration is seldom the first 
consideration of the engineer, it is an important factor. 
Therefore, management must establish salary levels that are 
adequate, both in absolute and relative terms. In addition 
to a ttliving wageu, the engineer is entitled to remuneration 
which recognizes his contribution as related to that of other 
groups. Attention is also required in connection with salary 
systems for engineering personnel. The narrowing salary dif-
ferentials between experienced and novice engineers must be 
widened. Company policies should allow for continued finan-
cial advancement of the engineer who remains in specialized 
work as well as his supervisory counterpart. 
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Man~gement must take steps to enhance the profes-
sional status of the engineer. For example, the title of 
t1engineertt should not be conferred on personnel performing 
technical work below the professional level. It should be 
company policy to use its engineers to the maximum of their 
capabilities by providing adequate technical and non-
technical assistance. Personnel practices such as requiring 
the engineer to punch a time clock should also be eliminated. 
There.must be opportunity for the continuation of 
professional development. In addition to internal training, 
the engineer should be encouraged to obtain additional educa-
tion and to participate in activities of engineering soci-
eties. As part of this program, the engineer should be given 
time off plus substantial reimbursement for tuition and dues. 
Communication between management and the engineer-
ing employee must be improved. The company's basic policies 
should be conveyed to engineers through proper orientation 
and training programs. Engineers require an understanding 
of their position in relation to management objectives. 
They need to know their responsibilities and their oppor-
tunities for advancement. In turn, engineers must be provided 
with adequate means of expression. Appropriate machinery for 
resolving individual grievances is vital. The free flow of 
ideas and suggestions should not be restricted. It is of 
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paramount impo:rtance that the lines o:f communi.cation work both 
ways to promote understanding between employee and employer. 
Management has an obligation to keep pace with ad-
vances in the :field of human relations. Like all employees, 
the engineer is entitled to fair and impartial treatment. Hu-
man relations should be made an important part of engineering 
supervisory training programs. 
D. The Engineer's Responsibility 
To retain a professional standing, the engineer 
must recognize his obligation to society and accept the as-
sociated ethical and moral responsibilities. The attainment 
of the status peculiar to members of the learned professions 
requires a dedication to duty that goes beyond personal gain. 
The engineer should per:form every assignment to the best of 
his knowledge and ability. At all times he should conduct 
himsel:f in a manner that reflects credit upon the engineer-
ing profession. 
He should support and participate in the acti vi-· 
ties of the engineering societies. As in any organization, 
strength is proportional to the interest of the membership. 
The engineer should seek committee appointments and election 
to the governing boards of the societies. Professional unity 
and other important problems should be studied and discussed 
with :fellow engineers in order to insure equitable solutions. 
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The engineering employee has definite responsibili-
ties to his employer. The engineer must give top perfor-
mance on his job; this is what he is being paid to do. He 
should understand how his decisions affect management objec-
tives and accept responsibility for them. Professional value 
should be enhanced by taking full advantage of educational 
and training opportunities. Furthermore, the engineer must 
broaden his background and demonstrate leadership ability in 
preparation for advancement. 
An engineering degree in itself does not entitle 
the recipient to professional recognition, nor does it gua-
rantee advancement. The engineer who labors under these as-
sumptions has little right to be critical of his treatment. 
It is evident that the engineer who wants to move forward 
must accept responsibility for his own development, using 
every possible means that will help him carry out a continu-
ing self-development program. 
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APPENDIX 
ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS EMPLOYED BY 
INDUSTRY IN JANUARY-1954* 
Industry 
All Industries 
Scientists and Engineers 
Total Engineers 
553,8oo 4o8,8oo 
Manufacturing 438,600 
Food and kindred products 14,4cro 
Textile-mill products and app~rel 5,900 
Paper and allied products 6,600 
Chemicals and allied products 62,700 
Petroleum products and extraction 38,500 
Rubber products 7,800 
Stone, clay, and glass products 9,600 
Primary metal industries 26,600 
Fabricated metal products and ordnance 21,900 
Machinery 60,300 
Electrical equipment 61,000 
Aircraft and parts 48,500 
Professional and scientific instruments 18,800 
other manufacturing 56,000 
Non-manufacturing 115,100 
Construction 28,4oo 
Telecommunication and radio broadcasting 28,600 
Transportation and other public utilities 33,200 
Other manufacturing 24,900 
310,200. 
6 croo 
' 3,croo 
3;800 
26,000 
22,600 
4,600 
6,200 
16,000 
17,800 
53,4oO 
51,100 
41,100 
13,900 
44,700 
98,500 
26,300 
27,4oO 
28,500 
. 16,300 
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CHARTER MEMBERS 
OF 
ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS OF AMERICA* 
J:.ssociation 
Engineers Association 
New Hyde Park, N. Y. 
Minneapolis Federation of 
Honeywell Engineer, Minneap-
olis, Minn. 
Engineers Guild of Oregon 
Portland, Ore. 
Seattle Professional Engin-
eering Employees Assn. 
Seattle, Wash. 
Engineers and Archi tect.s 
Association, Los Angeles, 
Burbank, San Diego, Calif. 
Engineers Association of Arma 
Brooklyn, N. Y. 
San Francisco Area Group of 
Professional Employees, Oak-
land, Calif. 
Association of Professional 
Engineering Personnel, 
camden, N. J". 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
Engineers Association, Chat-
tanooga, Tenn. 
*25, P• 31 
Where Employed: 
Sperry Gyroscope Co. 
Minneapolis Honeywell Regu-
lator Co. 
Timber Structures, Inc., 
Municipal Engineers of City 
of Portland, Oregon State 
Highway Dept. 
Boeing Airplane Co., Conti-
nental can Co., Isaacson 
Iron Works, G. E. X-ray 
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 
Lockheed Aircraft Service 
Corp. Consolidated Vul.tee 
Aircraft Corp., Rheems Mfg. 
Co., City and County of Los 
Angeles, California State 
Highway Dept. 
Arma Corp. 
Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 
employees of the Western 
Association of Engineers, 
Architects and Surveyors, East 
Bay Municipal Utility District, 
City of Alameda. 
RCA-Victor Division (Camden 
(Plant)'. 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
Association 
Research and Engineering Pro-· 
fessional Employees Associ-
ation, Whiting, Ind. 
Association of Engineers and 
Engineering Assistants, 
Drexel Hill, Pa. 
Council of Western Electric 
Technical Employees (National) 
Newark, N. J.; Oak Park, Ill.; 
Baltimore, Md. 
Southern California Profes-
sional Engineers Assn., Los 
Angeles, Calif. 
Association of Industrial 
Scientists, Emeryville, 
Calif. 
Where Employed 
Standard Oil of Indiana 
G. E. Philadelphia Switchgear 
Works 
Western Electric Co. 
Douglas Aircraft Corp., 
Southern California Gas Co., 
Los Angeles Dept. of Water 
and :Power 
Shell Development Co. 
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